20 Papers
42 Citations
Sixie Yu is an academic researcher from Washington University in St. Louis. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Public goods game. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 18 publications. Previous affiliations of Sixie Yu include Vanderbilt University & Chinese Academy of Sciences.
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Papers
•Posted Content
Adversarial Regression with Multiple Learners
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of adversarial linear regression with multiple learners and approximate the resulting game by exhibiting an upper bound on learner loss functions, and show that the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
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•Posted Content
Adversarial Classification on Social Networks
TL;DR: This work develops a novel bi-level programming approach for this problem, as well as a novel solution approach based on implicit function gradients, and experimentally demonstrates the advantage of the approach over alternatives which ignore network structure.
13
Learning Deep Features For MSR-bing Information Retrieval Challenge
Qiang Song,Sixie Yu,Cong Leng,Jiaxiang Wu,Qinghao Hu,Jian Cheng +5 more
- 13 Oct 2015
TL;DR: A CNN-based feature representation for visual recognition only using image-level information is proposed, which is pre-trained on a collection of clean datasets and fine-tuned on the bing datasets.
6
•Posted Content
Removing Malicious Nodes from Networks
Sixie Yu,Yevgeniy Vorobeychik +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formalize the problem of removing potentially malicious nodes from a network under uncertainty through an objective that takes connectivity into account, and show that optimally solving the resulting problem is NP-Hard.
5
•Proceedings Article
Inducing Equilibria in Networked Public Goods Games through Network Structure Modification
David Kempe,Sixie Yu,Yevgeniy Vorobeychik +2 more
- 05 May 2020
TL;DR: In this article, targeted network modifications with the goal of inducing equilibria of a particular form were studied for a variety of equilibrium forms (induce all agents to invest, at least a given set S, exactly a given subset S, at most k agents, and at least k agents).
4