Richard C. Sansing
Dartmouth College
94 Papers
595 Citations
Richard C. Sansing is an academic researcher from Dartmouth College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Deferred tax & Indirect tax. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 90 publications. Previous affiliations of Richard C. Sansing include Rutgers University & Tilburg University.
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Papers
Is the Effective Tax Rate an Effective Performance Measure
TL;DR: In this paper, the properties of the effective tax rate (ETR) as a measure of managerial tax planning effectiveness using a principal-agent model were examined and it was concluded that ETR is an ineffective measure of the agent's performance.
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Licensing Intellectual Property With Self-Reported Outcomes:
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined self-reporting licensing contracts using a game-theoretic approach to royalty compliance, and found that selfreporting either limits the licensee's rents, but lowers social welfare, or enhances social welfare by facilitating use of the IP by the low-cost licensee instead of the high-cost licensor.
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Multinational Taxation and R&D Investments
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the effects of taxation on the incentives of multinational firms to develop and use intellectual property and found that a higher domestic tax rate decreases investment in R&D if production occurs in the domestic country, but increases investment in the foreign country.
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Escaping the transitional gains trap
TL;DR: Cordes, Goldfarb, and Barth as mentioned in this paper argue that when policy changes are perfectly anticipated, compensation is inappropriate because those expectations were taken into account when investment choices were made.
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Discussion of The Interrelationship between Estimated Tax Payments and Taxpayer Compliance
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that a taxpayer's prepayment position is endogenously determined, which in turn affects the strategic interaction in the tax compliance game, and that behavior that appears to be illogical when tax compliance is framed as a single-person decision theory problem is optimal if one assumes that tax compliance are a multiplayer, strategic game.
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