Ralf Küsters
University of Stuttgart
150 Papers
1.4K Citations
Ralf Küsters is an academic researcher from University of Stuttgart. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Cryptographic protocol. The author has an hindex of 33, co-authored 140 publications. Previous affiliations of Ralf Küsters include University of Trier & Stanford University.
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Papers
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Ralf Küsters,Tomasz Truderung,Andreas Vogt +2 more
- 04 Oct 2010
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a new, widely applicable definition of accountability, with interpretations both in symbolic and computational models, and apply their definitions to the analysis of protocols for three different tasks: contract-signing, voting, and auctions.
201
A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0
Daniel Fett,Ralf Küsters,Guido Schmitz +2 more
- 24 Oct 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a formal analysis of the OAuth 2.0 standard in an expressive web model and prove that the fixed version of OAuth (with security recommendations and best practices in place) provides the authorization, authentication and session integrity properties we specify.
178
Non-standard inferences in description logics
Ralf Küsters
- 01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This paper presents a meta-analysis of substitution in the context of LCS and MSC, which shows clear relationships between the number of explicit and implicit beliefs and the value of these beliefs.
148
Using ProVerif to Analyze Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation
Ralf Küsters,Tomasz Truderung +1 more
- 08 Jul 2009
TL;DR: Surprisingly, the reduction for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation is more efficient than the one for XOR, and works for a large class of Horn theories, allowing to model a wide range of intruder capabilities and protocols.
141
Deciding the Security of Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation and Products in Exponents
Yannick Chevalier,Ralf Küsters,Michaël Rusinowitch,Mathieu Turuani +3 more
- 15 Dec 2003
TL;DR: An NP decision procedure for the formal analysis of protocols in presence of modular exponentiation with products allowed in exponents is presented, illustrating that the model is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the A-GDH.2 protocol suite.
133