https://www.hse.ru/data/816/479/1225/Oct%2019%20Cited%20%231%20Manage%20THE%20THEORY%20OF%20PLANNED%20BEHAVIOR.pdf

The theory of planned behavior

(2004). TARGET ARTICLES: 'Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications' Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 197-215.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/20447229

Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self-select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for ratio...

/pdf/motivated-skepticism-in-the-evaluation-of-political-beliefs-16wliig8zz.pdf

Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs (2006)

A general conceptual model and specific hypotheses about how the meanings attached to strategic issues by decision makers are translated into organizational responses are presented. The model integrates an interpretive view of organizational decision making with cognitive categorization theory. The hypotheses focus on how labeling an issue as either a threat or an opportunity affects both subsequent information processing and the motivations of key decision makers. It is argued that decision makers' cognitions and motivations systematically affect the processing of issues and the types of organizational actions taken in response to them. Both theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to Organizational Action

This paper argues that thought is a necessary condition of emotion. It therefore opposes the •stance taken by Zajonc, which reflects two widespread misunderstandings about what is meant by cognitive processes in emotion: (a) that a cognitive appraisal of the significance of an encounter for one's well-being must occur in fixed stages through the information processing of initially meaningless inputs from the environment; and (b) that such an appraisal is necessarily deliberate, rational, and conscious. Some of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic implications of a cognitive theory of emotion are also discussed briefly. Recent years have seen a major change in the way psychologists view emotion—the rediscovery that emotions are products of cognitive processes. The emotional response is elicited by an evaluative perception in lower animals, and in humans by a complex 'cognitive appraisal of the significance of events for one's well-being. Although there are many other issues concerning the relations between emotion and cognition, my comments will focus on the role of thought in the emotional response. I will refer often to Zajonc's (1980) challenge to the assumption that cognition occurs prior to emotion. I use his views to illustrate widespread misunderstandings of what it means to speak of cognition as a causal antecedent of emotion; I also use his views as a point of departure for rny argument that cognitive activity is a necessary as well as sufficient condition of emotion. Do Emotions Require Cognitive Mediation? My own position on this question is a variant of a family of theories of emotion centered on the concept of cognitive appraisal. Campos and Sternberg (1981) state, for example, that \"The recent history of the study of emotion has been dominated by approaches stressing cognitive factors. In theories of adult emotional response, cognitive appraisal now functions as the central construct\" (p. 273). Its role is, to mediate the relationship between the person and the environment. The appraisal process gives rise to a particular emotion with greater or lesser intensity depending on how the relationship is evaluated with respect to the person's well-being. Cognitive appraisal means that the way one interprets one's plight at any given moment is crucial to the emotional response. Cognition and emotion are usually fused in nature (Folkman, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1979), although they can be dissociated in certain unusual or abnormal states. For example, cognitive coping processes (cf. Lazarus, 1981) such as isolation and intellectualization (or detachment), which are aimed at regulating feelings, can create a dissociation between thoughts and feelings. Moreover, attack can occur without anger, and avoidance without fear. These latter conditions are also instances in which the usual link between thought and feeling has been loosened or broken. Yet such separations are less often a rule of living and more often a product of coping under special circumstances. The full experience of emotion (as opposed to sham rage, for example) normally includes three fused components: thoughts, action impulses, and somatic disturbances. When these components are dissociated we are left with something other than what we mean by a true emotional state. Our theories of emotion must reflect the normal fusion, and separating thoughts, action impulses, and so^ matic disturbances except under certain specifiable conditions (as was done in the old days of faculty psychology—which treated cognition, emotion, and motivation as independent entities) distorts rather than clarifies the structure of the mind (cf. Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1982). One bit of fallout from the above analysis is the implication, often derived from statements of cognitive theory, that cognitive appraisal is a necessary I wish to thank my research colleague, Susan Folkman, and my secretary, Carol Carr, for providing substantial editorial advice on this article. I appreciate their skill and judgment. Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard S. Lazarus, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, 4105 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, California 94720. Vol. 37, No. 9, 1019-1024 Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • SEPTEMBER 1982 • 1019 0003-066X/82/3709-1019$00.75 I as well as sufficient condition of emotion. Such a position has been criticized trenchantly by Zajonc (1980). He writes that affect is erroneously regarded in contemporary psychological theory as postcognitive, occurring only after extensive cognitive operations have taken place, and that in actuality affective judgments are fairly independent of, and even precede, the perceptual and cognitive activities on which they are said to depend. Zajonc argues that not only can affect occur without extensive perceptual and cognitive encoding—and even before—but that affect and cognition are controlled by separate and partially independent neural systems (see also Tomkins, 1981). Zajonc thus seems to be saying two things contrary to what I have argued: first, that the proposed directionality in which cognition determines affect is wrorig and that the actual direction is affect to cognition; and second, that cognition and affect should be regarded as relatively independent subsystems rather than as fused and highly interdependent. Building his argument, Zajonc cites a stanza of poetry from e. e. cummings (1973): since feeling is first who pays any attention to the syntax of things will never wholly kiss you. (p. 160) He also cites Wundt's (1907) concept of affective primacy, and Bartlett (1932), Ittelson (1973), Osgood (1962), and Premack (1976) as having adopted the view that feelings come first. He states, for example: . < In fact, it is entirely possible that the very first stage of the organism's reaction to stimuli and the very first elements in retrieval are affective. It is further possible that we can like something or be afraid of it before we know precisely what it is and perhaps even without knowing what it is. (p. 154) The most serious mistake in Zajonc's analysis lies in his approach to cognition, which is characteristic of much of present-day cognitive psychology. In this approach information and meaning stem from the conception of mind as an analogue to a computer (Shannon & Weaver, 1962), a view illustrated also by the work of Newell and Simon (1961) and Weiner (I960). This conception has been rebutted by Dreyfus (1972), Polanyi (1958, 1966), and others, although the rebuttal has not affected the mainstream of cognitive psychology. The mainstream stance is that meanings for decision and action are built up from essentially meaningless stimulus display elements or bits and that systematic scanning of this display generates information. Thus, human cognition, like the operations of a computer, proceeds by serially receiving, registering, encoding, storing for the shortor longrun, and \"retrieving meaningless bits—a transformation to meaning that is called \"information processing.\" Meanings and their associated emotions, or hot cognitions as Abelson (1963) referred to them, are built through such processing. As Erdelyi (1974) and others (e.g., Neisser, 1967) have suggested, however, emotion can influence the process at any of its stages. With this in mind, it is not surprising that Zajonc might be troubled by the implication that emotion lies at the end of a tortuous cognitive chain of information processing, and therefore find it necessary to suggest an independent system making possible rapid, nonreflective emotional reactions. As many have argued (Folkman et al., 1979; Wrubel, Benner, & Lazarus, 1981), humans are meaning-oriented, meaning-creating creatures who constantly evaluate events from the perspective of their well-being and react emotionally to some of these evaluations. Zajonc is therefore correct in asserting that meanings are immediately inherent in emotionally laden transactions without lengthy or sequential processing, but for the wrong reasons. In my view, the concept of meaning defined by the traditional information processing approach subscribed to by Zajonc has a perfectly reasonable-—and better—alternative. We do not always have to await revelation from information processing to unravel the environmental code. As was argued in the New Look movement in perception, personal factors such as beliefs, expectations, and motives or commitments influence attention and appraisal at the very outset of any encounter. Concern with individual differences leads inevitably to concern with personal meanings and to the factors that shape such meanings. We actively select and shape experience and in some degree mold it to our own requirements (see also Rychlak, 1981). Information processing as an exclusive model of cognition is insufficiently concerned with the person as a source of meaning. The history of debate about the phenomenon of subception is instructive (see Eriksen, 1956, 1960, 1962; Lazarus, 1956; Lazarus & McCleary, 1951). In a controversial experiment, McCleary and I showed that by associating a set of nonsense syllables to the threat of a painful electric shock, subjects would later react with a galvanic skin response selectively to the shock-associated syllables, even when they had misperceived and misreported, them. We referred to this phenomenon as \"autonomic discrimination without awareness,\" or \"sub1020 • SEPTEMBER 1982 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST ception,\" arguing that subjects somehow sensed the threat without consciously recognizing the syllables. The debate sparked by this interpretation touched on many complex issues, but it mainly centered on a claim by Bricker and Chapanis (1953) and Eriksen (1956, 1960, 1962) that even though the subjects had misreported what had been flashed on the screen, they probably had registered perceptually some of the structural elements of the syllables and had, in effect, reacted automatica

Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition.

Computer simulation of "hot cognition"

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Computer simulation of "hot cognition"