This paper first gives a definition for personal communication,then discusses some key problems to be solved in realizing PC and lastly gives some personal suggestions.

On Personal Communication

A global public-key infrastructure (PKI), components of which are emerging in the near future, is a prerequisite for security in distributed systems and for electronic commerce The purpose of this paper is to propose an approach to modelling and reasoning about a PKI from a user Alice's point of view Her view, from which she draws conclusions about the authenticity of other entities' public keys and possibly about the trustworthiness of other entities, consists of statements about which public keys she believes to be authentic and which entities she believes to be trustworthy, as well as a collection of certificates and recommendations obtained or retrieved from the PKI The model takes into account recommendations for the trustworthiness of entities Furthermore, it includes confidence values for statements and can exploit arbitrary certification structures containing multiple intersecting certification paths to achieve a higher confidence value than for any single certification path Confidence values are measured on a continuous scale between 0 and 1 and, in contrast to previous work in this area, are interpreted as probabilities in a well-defined random experiment

/pdf/modelling-a-public-key-infrastructure-2syk0ecd2e.pdf

Modelling a Public-Key Infrastructure

Constructive cryptography, an application of abstract cryptography proposed by Maurer and Renner, is a new paradigm for defining the security of cryptographic schemes such as symmetric encryption, message authentication codes, public-key encryption, key-agreement protocols, and digital signature schemes, and for proving the security of protocols making use of such schemes. Such a cryptographic scheme can be seen (and defined) as constructing a certain resource (e.g. a channel or key) with certain security properties from another (weaker) such resource. For example, a secure encryption scheme constructs a secure channel from an authenticated channel and a secret key.

The term "construct", which is defined by the use of a simulator, is composable in the sense that a protocol obtained by the composition of several secure constructive steps is itself secure. This is in contrast to both the traditional, game-based security definitions for cryptographic schemes and the attack-based security definitions used in formal-methods based security research, which are generally not composable.

Constructive cryptography allows to take a new look at cryptography and the design of cryptographic protocols. One can give explicit meaning to various types of game-based security notions of confidentiality, integrity, and malleability, one can design key agreement, secure communication, certification, and other protocols in a modular and composable manner, and one can separate the understanding of what cryptography achieves from the technical security definitions and proofs, which is useful for didactic purposes and protocol design.

/pdf/constructive-cryptography-a-new-paradigm-for-security-3rlwdqsanb.pdf

Constructive cryptography --- a new paradigm for security definitions and proofs

All information-theoretically secure key agreement protocols (e.g. based on quantum cryptography or on noisy channels) described in the literature are secure only against passive adversaries in the sense that they assume the existence of an authenticated public channel. The goal of this paper is to investigate information-theoretic security even against active adversaries with complete control over the communication channel connecting the two parties who want to agree on a secret key. Several impossibility results are proved and some scenarios are characterized in which secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is possible. In particular, when each of the parties, including the adversary, can observe a sequence of random variables that are correlated between the parties, the rate at which key agreement against active adversaries is possible is characterized completely: it is either 0 or equal to the rate achievable against passive adversaries, and the condition for distinguishing between the two cases is given.

/pdf/information-theoretically-secure-secret-key-agreement-by-not-417rhbjptn.pdf

Information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement by NOT authenticated public discussion

Most model checking techniques for security protocols make a number of simplifying assumptions on the protocol and/or on its execution environment that prevent their applicability in some important cases. For instance, most techniques assume that communication between honest principals is controlled by a Dolev -Yao intruder, i.e. a malicious agent capable to overhear, divert, and fake messages. Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a protocol that relies on a less unsecure channel (e.g. a confidential channel provided by some other protocol sitting lower in the protocol stack). In this paper we propose a general model for security protocols based on the set-rewriting formalism that, coupled with the use of LTL, allows for the specification of assumptions on principals and communication channels as well as complex security properties that are normally not handled by state-of-the-art protocol analysers. By using our approach we have been able to formalise all the assumptions required by the ASW protocol for optimistic fair exchange as well as some of its security properties. Besides the previously reported attacks on the protocol, we report a new attack on a patched version of the protocol.

LTL Model Checking for Security Protocols

A calculus of channel security properties is presented which allows the analysis and comparison of protocols for establishing secure channels in a distributed open system at a high level of abstraction. A channel is characterized by its direction, its time of availability and its security properties. Cryptographic primitives as well as trust relations are interpreted as transformations for channel security properties, and a cryptographic protocol can be viewed as a sequence of such transformations. A protocol thus allows to transform a set of secure channels established during an initial setup phase, together with a set of insecure channels available during operation of the system, into the set of secure channels specified by the security requirements. The necessary and sufficient requirements for establishing a secure channel between two entities A and B are characterized in terms of secure channels to be made available during the initial setup phase and in terms of the minimal trust A and B must have into other entities or into trusted third parties.

A calculus for security boots trapping in distributed systems

This paper presents a calculus of channel security properties which allows to analyze and compare protocols for establishing secure channels in an insecure open network at a high level of abstraction A channel is characterized by its direction, time of availability and its security properties Cryptographic primitives and trust relations are interpreted as transformations for channel security properties, and cryptographic protocols can be viewed as combinations of such transformations A protocol thus allows to transform a set of secure channels established during an initial setup phase, together with a set of insecure channels available during operation of the system, into the set of secure channels specified by the security requirements The necessary and sufficient requirements for establishing a secure channel between two entities are characterized in terms of secure channels to be made available during the initial setup phase and in terms of trust relations between users and/or between users and trusted authorities

/pdf/a-calculus-for-secure-channel-establishment-in-open-networks-3r92kabbqn.pdf

A Calculus for Secure Channel Establishment in Open Networks

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A calculus for security boots trapping in distributed systems

A Calculus for Secure Channel Establishment in Open Networks