Paul Schuler
University of Arizona
41 Papers
310 Citations
Paul Schuler is an academic researcher from University of Arizona. The author has contributed to research in topics: Opposition (politics) & Legislature. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 34 publications. Previous affiliations of Paul Schuler include University of California, San Diego.
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Papers
Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament
Edmund J. Malesky,Paul Schuler +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a content analysis of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly is presented, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day, and they find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with co-optation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents.
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Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament
Edmund J. Malesky,Paul Schuler +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a content analysis of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly is presented, where delegates question the Prime Minister and Cabinet Members on important issues of the day, and they find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with co-option theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents.
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The Single-Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition
Edmund J. Malesky,Paul Schuler +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore how single-party regimes manage this trade-off and the particular types of information available to them, and show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.
The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that under these conditions, transparency may have perverse effects, and test this theory with a randomized experiment on delegate behavior in query sessions in Vietnam, a single-party authoritarian regime.
The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that under these conditions, transparency may have perverse effects, and test this theory with a randomized experiment on delegate behavior in query sessions in Vietnam, a single-party authoritarian regime.
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