The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

/pdf/handbook-of-computational-social-choice-12i1xbv1b8.pdf

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these markets, externalities such as complementarities and peer effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each agent. Further, research has shown that externalities lead to serious problems for market stability and for developing efficient algorithms to find stable matchings. In this paper we make the observation that peer effects are often the result of underlying social connections, and we explore a formulation of the many-to-one matching market where peer effects are derived from an underlying social network. The key feature of our model is that it captures peer effects and complementarities using utility functions, rather than traditional preference ordering. With this model and considering a weaker notion of stability, namely twosided exchange stability, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. To characterize the efficiency of matching markets with externalities, we provide general bounds on how far the welfare of the worst-case stable matching can be from the welfare of the optimal matching, and find that the structure of the social network (e.g. how well clustered the network is) plays a large role.

/pdf/peer-effects-and-stability-in-matching-markets-4ipghh50su.pdf

Peer effects and stability in matching markets

One of the stylized facts from the past 30 years has been the declining rate of first births before age 30 for all women and the increase rate of first births after age 30 among women with four-year college degrees (Steven P. Martin, Demography, 37(4), 523–533, 2000). What are some of the factors behind women’s decision to postpone their childbearing? We hypothesize that the wage difference often observed between like-educated mothers and non-mothers (Jane Waldfogel, Journal of Labor Economics, 16, 505–545, 1998a; Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(1) 137–156, 1998b) may be affected by the postponement of childbearing until after careers are fully established. Hence, we focus on college-educated women because they are typically more career-oriented than their non-college educated counterparts and also the group most often observed postponing maternity. We use individual-level data on women from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) in order to control for individual-level unobserved heterogeneity as well as human capital characteristics, such as actual work experience, in our empirical analysis. We estimate wage equations, first producing base-line results to compare to the existing literature. Then, we expand the basic wage equation model to address fundamental econometric issues and the education/fertility issue at hand. Our empirical findings are two-fold. First, we find that college-educated mothers do not experience a motherhood wage penalty at all. In fact, they enjoy a wage boost when compared to college-educated childless women. Second, fertility delay enhances this wage boost even further. Our results provide an explanation for the observed postponement of maternity for educated women. We argue that the wage boost experienced by college-educated mothers may be the result of their search for family–friendly work environments, which, in turn, yields job matches with more female-friendly firms offering greater opportunities for advancement.

http://homepages.wmich.edu/~jkimmel/motherhood wage gap for women.pdf

“The Motherhood Wage Gap for Women in the United States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay”

Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value for an arbitrary exogenous coalition structure leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payos around an “externality-free” value. In endogenizing the coalition structure, we analyze a two-stage process of coalition formation in whose second stage our axiomatic results are applied. We find reasons to explain inecient coalition structures, and provide sucient conditions for eciency.

/pdf/marginal-contributions-and-externalities-in-the-value-3t556rfgk3.pdf

Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these markets, externalities such as complementarities and peer effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each agent. Further, research has shown that externalities lead to serious problems for market stability and for developing efficient algorithms to find stable matchings. In this paper we make the observation that peer effects are often the result of underlying social connections, and we explore a formulation of the many-to-one matching market where peer effects are derived from an underlying social network. The key feature of our model is that it captures peer effects and complementarities using utility functions, rather than traditional preference ordering. With this model and considering a weaker notion of stability, namely two-sided exchange stability, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. We also give distributed algorithms that are guaranteed to converge to a two-sided exchange stable matching. To assess the competitive ratio of these algorithms and to more generally characterize the efficiency of matching markets with externalities, we provide general bounds on how far the welfare of the worst-case stable matching can be from the welfare of the optimal matching, and find that the structure of the social network (e.g. how well clustered the network is) plays a large role.

Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets

Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent's preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers' ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.

/pdf/many-to-one-matching-when-colleagues-matter-a01kzij6ko.pdf

Many-to-One Matching When Colleagues Matter

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this mechanism, to be called tops covering, is strategy-proof even if the core is not a singleton. Furthermore, we also find out that the tops covering mechanism is the only strategy-proof mechanism that always selects stable allocations.

/pdf/tops-responsiveness-strategy-proofness-and-coalition-4z4qdtactl.pdf

Tops responsiveness, strategy-proofness and coalition formation problems

The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets

Este trabajo estudia los mercados de emparejamiento bilateral multiple en los cuales las preferencias de cada agente dependen no solo de las caracteristicas de la institucion que le contrata, si no que tambien dependen del grupo de colegas contratados por la misma institucion La existencia de asignaciones en el nucleo no esta asegurada con un dominio no restringido de preferencias Presentamos algunas condiciones sobre las preferencias de los agentes que determinan dos posibles situaciones En ambas, existe al menos una asignacion estable La primera refleja situaciones de la vida real en las cuales los agentes estan mas interesados en tener un grupo aceptable de colegas que en las caracteristicas de la empresa que le contrate La segunda se refiere a mercados en los que un orden de trabajadores es aceptado por todos los agentes presentes en el mercado

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74255/1/NDL2007-087.pdf

Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

Handle everyday research tasks with reliable, citation-backed results

Your personal Research Agent to handle research tasks with citation-backed results

Popular Tasks used by Researchers

How can I help with your research?

Meet SciSpace

Get more enhanced response by uploading the PDFs you want me to reference.

No relevant PDFs in your library

SciSpace is the AI research assistant for academics. Run systematic literature reviews on 280M+ papers, and write papers with cited sources. Trusted by 1M+ students, PhDs & researchers.

SciSpace | AI for Research

Analyze PDFs

Code & Manuscripts

Funding & Grants

Literature & Patents

Medical & Clinical Data

Systematic Review

Visualize & Present

Web & Data

Build a Google Scholar-like website for your research.

Build a website

Create charts and images for your research

Create a Chart

Write a paper for submission to a journal

Draft a manuscript

Patent Search

Design eye-catching scientific posters in minutes.

Scientific Poster Generation

Systematic Literature Review

One task is running at the moment. Your messages will be shown right after.

Drag and drop or click here to browse

Loved by <highlight>1 million+</highlight> researchers

Extract a list of specific topics and their sources from unstructured text

Topics

Compare and analyze relevant papers that matches with your search

Papers

Get insights from PDFs and bookmarked papers from your library

My library

Recent searches

Try searching for:

Catch AI-generated content in scholarly and non-scholarly content

{ai} Detector

Ai Writer

Get PDF Summaries, highlighted text explanations 

Chat with PDF

Effortlessly create in-text citations and bibliographies in APA and 2,500 other formats

Citation generator

Get explanations, summaries, and answers on academic papers

Ease up your research workflow with {scispace}'s cohort of exciting AI tools

Elevate your academic writing skills and convey your ideas the way you want

Paraphraser

Explore our range of reading and writing tools

Your file is being prepared and should be ready in a few minutes. If it's a large file, it might take a bit longer. You can close this window, and we'll email you the file when it's done.

You have reached a maximum limit of <strong>{limit}</strong> columns in the table. Remove at least <strong>1</strong> column to add or create another one.

Pablo Revilla

Author Tools

Chat about Author