Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
University of Málaga
38 Papers
54 Citations
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez is an academic researcher from University of Málaga. The author has contributed to research in topics: Equilibrium selection & Strategic complements. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 35 publications. Previous affiliations of Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez include University of Alicante.
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Papers
Bounded Confidence under Preferential Flip: A Coupled Dynamics of Structural Balance and Opinions.
TL;DR: This work proposes a model where agents form opinions under bounded confidence, but only considering the opinions of their friends, and finds that this model produces the segregation of agents into two cliques, with the opinions in one clique differing from those in the other.
On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an elementary definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect Bayes equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium and argue that there are situations in which it is not clear what "whenever possible" means.
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An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games
TL;DR: This work is the first to model this credibility of cheap-talk messages and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies.
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Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
Antonio Cabrales,Francesco Feri,Francesco Feri,Piero Gottardi,Piero Gottardi,Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez +5 more
TL;DR: It is argued that the collapse of the market for information is a demand phenomenon, and even small uncertainty over the quality of information seems to have a large impact.
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Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence
Antonio Cabrales,Antonio Cabrales,Francesco Feri,Piero Gottardi,Piero Gottardi,Piero Gottardi,Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez +6 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report on experiments testing the viabi lity of markets for cheap talk information and find that these markets are fragile, and that those adopting deceptive strategies tend to be envious or non-pro-social traits.