Michele Grillo
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
10 Papers
92 Citations
Michele Grillo is an academic researcher from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Information asymmetry. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 9 publications.
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Papers
Collusion when the Number of Firms is Large
Luca Colombo,Michele Grillo +1 more
- 01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that collusion can always be sustained, regardless of the number of firms, provided the marginal cost function is sufficiently steep, and that an information exchange can sustain collusive behavior when the number is large.
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Anti-Trust Policy and National Growth: Some Evidence from Italy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that sectors which depend more heavily on inputs and services produced in sectors suffering from competition problems perform worse in terms of net exports, export growth and output growth.
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Anti-Trust Policy and National Growth: Some Evidence from Italy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that sectors which depend more heavily on inputs and services produced in sectors suffering from competition problems perform worse in terms of net exports, export growth and output growth.
13
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Competition Rules and the Cooperative Firm
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated whether and under what conditions the working of cooperative firms can be affected by competition law or market-enhancing regulations, and the nature of collective benefits sought by different types of cooperative enterprises is analyzed to show whether and how a tension may arise between the market mechanism and the mechanisms through which alternative collective benefits are attained by cooperative firms.
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Competition rules and the cooperative firm
Michele Grillo
- 10 Jul 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated whether and under what conditions the working of cooperative firms can be affected by competition law or market-enhancing regulations, and the nature of collective benefits sought by different types of cooperative enterprises is analyzed to show whether and how a tension may arise between the market mechanism and the mechanisms through which alternative collective benefits are attained by cooperative firms.
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