Michael Karlinger
Johannes Kepler University of Linz
11 Papers
69 Citations
Michael Karlinger is an academic researcher from Johannes Kepler University of Linz. The author has contributed to research in topics: XML schema & Encryption. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 11 publications.
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Papers
Pseudonymization with Metadata Encryption for Privacy-Preserving Searchable Documents
Johannes Heurix,Michael Karlinger,Thomas Neubauer +2 more
- 04 Jan 2012
TL;DR: This work presents a security protocol for data privacy that is strictly controlled by the data owner, and integrates pseudonymization and encryption techniques to create a methodology that uses pseudonyms as access control mechanism, protects secret cryptographic keys by a layer-based security model, and provides privacy-preserving querying.
Inclusion Dependencies in XML: Extending Relational Semantics
Michael Karlinger,Millist W. Vincent,Michael Schrefl +2 more
- 25 Aug 2009
TL;DR: This article defines a new type of integrity constraint in XML, called an XML inclusion constraint (XIND), and shows that it extends the semantics of a relational inclusion dependency, and presents an axiom system that is shown to be sound and complete.
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PERiMETER – pseudonymization and personal metadata encryption for privacy-preserving searchable documents
TL;DR: PeriMETER is presented, a security protocol for data privacy that is strictly controlled by the data owner that integrates pseudonymization and encryption to create a methodology that uses pseudonyms as access control mechanism, protects secret cryptographic keys by a layer-based security model, and provides privacy-preserving querying.
10
A hybrid approach integrating encryption and pseudonymization for protecting electronic health records
Johannes Heurix,Michael Karlinger,Michael Schrefl,Thomas Neubauer +3 more
- 01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: This work proposes to integrate pseudonymization and encryption to a hybrid approach which not only protects against external attackers, but also ensures that even potential internal attackers with full data access, like administrators, cannot gain any useful information.