Maxwell B. Stinchcombe
University of Texas at Austin
53 Papers
298 Citations
Maxwell B. Stinchcombe is an academic researcher from University of Texas at Austin. The author has contributed to research in topics: Artificial neural network & Prior probability. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 51 publications. Previous affiliations of Maxwell B. Stinchcombe include University of California, San Diego.
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Papers
Multilayer feedforward networks are universal approximators
TL;DR: It is rigorously established that standard multilayer feedforward networks with as few as one hidden layer using arbitrary squashing functions are capable of approximating any Borel measurable function from one finite dimensional space to another to any desired degree of accuracy, provided sufficiently many hidden units are available.
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Universal approximation of an unknown mapping and its derivatives using multilayer feedforward networks
TL;DR: A shoulder strap retainer having a base to be positioned on the exterior shoulder portion of a garment with securing means attached to the undersurface of the base for removably securing the base to the exterior shoulders portion of the garment.
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Monitoring structural change
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose and analyze two real-time monitoring procedures with controlled size asymptotically: the fluctuation and CUSUM monitoring procedures, and extend an invariance principle in the sequential testing literature to obtain their results.
425
Consistent specification testing with nuisance parameters present only under the alternative
TL;DR: The nonparametric and the nuisance parameter approaches to consistently testing statistical models are both attempts to estimate topological measures of distance between a parametric and a non-parametric fit, and neither dominates in experiments as mentioned in this paper.
401
Extensive form games in continuous time: pure strategies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a continuous-time game model with a grid that is infinitely fine and show that for any sufficiently fine grid, there will exist an e-subgame perfect equilibrium for the corresponding game played on that grid which is within -of" the continuous time equilibrium.