accademiche [38]. Ada [45]. Adrian [45]. African [56]. Age [39, 49, 61]. Al [23]. Al-Rawi [23]. Aldous [68]. Alex [15]. Allure [46]. America [60, 66]. American [49, 69, 61, 52]. ancienne [25]. Andreas [28]. Angela [42]. Animals [16]. Ann [26]. Anna [19, 47]. Annotated [46]. Annotations [28]. Anti [37]. Anti-Copernican [37]. Antibiotic [64]. Anxiety [51]. Apocalyptic [61]. Archaeology [26]. Ark [36]. Artisan [32]. Asylum [48]. Atri [54]. Audra [65]. Australia [41]. Authorship [15]. Axelle [29].

/pdf/a-complete-bibliography-of-publications-in-isis-2000-2009-1nklqbzyfs.pdf

A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Isis, 2000{2009

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data. We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Perri for useful comments. The views expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of The World Bank. Business cycles are not the same in rich and poor countries. A first difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are smaller in rich countries than in poor ones, in the top panel of Figure 1 , we plot the standard deviation of per capita income growth against the level of (log) per capita income for a large sample of countries. We refer to this relationship as the volatility graph and note that it slopes downwards. A second difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , we plot the correlation of per capita income growth rates with world average per capita income growth, excluding the country in question, against the level of (log) per capita income for the same set of countries. We refer to this relationship as the comovement graph and note that it slopes upwards. Table 1 , which is self-explanatory, shows that these facts apply within different sub-samples of countries and years. 1 Why are business cycles less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones? Part of the answer must be that poor countries exhibit more political and policy instability, they are less open or more distant from the geographical center, and they also have a higher share of their economy devoted to the production of agricultural products and the extraction of minerals. Table 1 shows that, in a statistical sense, these factors explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the volatility of income growth, although they do not explain much of the variation in the comovement of income growth. More important for our purposes, the strong relationship between income and the properties of business cycles reported in Table 1 is still present after we control for these variables. In short, there must be other factors behind the strong patterns depicted in Figure 1 beyond differences in political instability, remoteness and the importance of natural resources. With the exception that the comovement graph seems to be driven by differences between rich and poor countries and not within each group. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also present the volatility graph. They provide an explanation for it based on the observation that rich countries have more diversified production structures. We are unaware of any previous reference to the comovement graph. In this paper, we develop two alternative but non-competing explanations for why business cycles are less volatile and more synchronized with the world in rich countries than in poor ones. Both explanations rely on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that require new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that require traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. This pattern of specialization opens up the possibility that cross-country differences in business cycles are the result of asymmetries between these types of industries. In particular, both of the explanations advanced here predict that industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers will be more sensitive to country-specific shocks. Ceteris paribus, these industries will not only be more volatile but also less synchronized with the world cycle since the relative importance of global shocks is lower. To the extent that the business cycles of countries reflect those of their industries, differences in industrial structure could potentially explain the patterns in Figure 1 . One explanation of why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that firms using new technologies face more inelastic product demands than those using traditional technologies. New technologies are difficult to imitate quickly for technical reasons and also because of legal patents. This difficulty confers a cost advantage on technological leaders that shelters them from potential entrants and gives them monopoly power in world markets. Traditional technologies are easier to imitate because enough time has passed since their adoption and also because patents have expired or have been circumvented. This implies that incumbent firms face tough competition from potential entrants and enjoy little or no monopoly power in world markets. The price-elasticity of product demand affects how industries react to shocks. Consider, for instance, the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries. In industries that use new technologies, firms have monopoly power and face inelastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply lead to opposing changes in prices that tend to stabilize industry income. In industries that use traditional technologies, firms face stiff competition from abroad and therefore face elastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply have little or no effect on their prices and industry income is more volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the degree of product-market competition is important, incomes of industries that use new technologies are likely to be less sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use traditional technologies. Another explanation for why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that the supply of unskilled workers is more elastic than the supply of skilled workers. A first reason for this asymmetry is that non-market activities are relatively more attractive to unskilled workers whose market wage is lower than that of skilled ones. Changes in labour demand might induce some unskilled workers to enter or abandon the labour force, but are not likely to affect the participation of skilled workers. A second reason for the asymmetry in labour supply across skill categories is the imposition of a minimum wage. Changes in labour demand might force some unskilled workers in and out of unemployment, but are not likely to affect the employment of skilled workers. The wage-elasticity of the labour supply also has implications for how industries react to shocks. Consider again the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries and therefore raise the labour demand. Since the supply of unskilled workers is elastic, these shocks lead to large fluctuations in employment of unskilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are therefore magnified by increases in employment that make industry income more volatile. Since the supply of skilled workers is inelastic, the same shocks have little or no effects on the employment of skilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are not magnified and industry income is less volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the elasticity of labour supply is important, incomes of industries that use unskilled workers are likely to be more sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use skilled workers To study these hypotheses we construct a stylized world equilibrium model of the cross-section of business cycles. Inspired by the work of Davis (1995), we consider in section one a world in which differences in both factor endowments a la Heckscher-Ohlin and industry technologies a la Ricardo combine to determine a country's comparative advantage and, therefore, the patterns of specialization and trade. To generate business cycles, we subject this world economy to the sort of productivity fluctuations that have been emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). 2 In section two, we characterize the cross-section of business cycles and show how asymmetries in the elasticity of product demand and/or labour supply can be used to explain the evidence in Figure 1 . Using available microeconomic estimates of the key parameters, we calibrate the model and find that: (i) The model exhibits slightly less than two-thirds and one-third of the observed cross-country variation in volatility and comovement, respectively; and (ii) The asymmetry in the elasticity of product demand seems to have a quantitatively stronger effect on the slopes of the volatility and comovement graphs, than the elasticity in the labour supply. We explore these results further in sections three and four. In section three, we extend the model to allow for monetary shocks that have real effects since firms face cash-in-advance constraints. We use the model to study how cross-country variation in monetary policy and financial development affect the cross-section of business cycles. Once these factors are considered, the calibrated version of the model exhibits roughly the same cross-country variation in volatility and about 40 percent of the variation in comovement as the data. In section four, we show th

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01322868.pdf

Business cycles: A methodological approach

That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession. Peter Novick

Economics is often described as the most politically influential social science and yet economic advice is often largely irrelevant to prominent policy debates. We draw on literatures in political science, sociology and science and technology studies to explain this apparent contradiction. Existing research suggests that the influence of economics is mediated by local circumstances and meso-level social structures, and thatmuchof it flows through indirect channels.Weelaborate three sitesofanalysis useful for unpacking these influences: the broad professional authority of economics, the institutional position of economists in government, and the role of economics in the cognitive infrastructure of policymaking, including the diffusion of economic styles of reasoning and the establishment of economic policy devices for seeing and deciding.

/pdf/do-economists-make-policies-on-the-political-effects-of-e15kapnvqm.pdf

Do economists make policies? On the political effects of economics

The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Anthropology

Project Camelot, a military-sponsored, social science study of revolution, was cancelled in 1965 amidst international and national discussion about the study's political implications. Subsequently, Camelot became the focus of a wide-ranging controversy about the connections between Cold War politics, military patronage, and American social science. This paper argues that following Camelot's demise, efforts to rethink the politics-patronage-social science nexus became an important part of what historian Peter Novick has called `the epistemological revolution that began in the 1960s'. Novick claims that `strictly academic' considerations provided the categories of analysis that challenged the scholarly mainstream's commitment to objectivity and related ideals, like value-neutrality and professional autonomy. In contrast, my analysis - which discusses post-WWII military patronage for the social sciences, Camelot's origins and cancellation, the ensuing controversy, and some long-term implications of this cont...

Project Camelot and the 1960s epistemological revolution : Rethinking the politics-patronage-social science nexus

Numerous popular and scholarly accounts have exposed the deep impact of patrons on the production of scientific knowledge and its applications. "Shaky Foundations" provides the first extensive examination of a new patronage system for the social sciences that emerged in the early Cold War years and took more definite shape during the 1950s and early 1960s, a period of enormous expansion in American social science.By focusing on the military, the Ford Foundation, and the National Science Foundation, Mark Solovey shows how this patronage system presented social scientists and other interested parties, including natural scientists and politicians, with new opportunities to work out the scientific identity, social implications, and public policy uses of academic social research. Solovey also examines significant criticisms of the new patronage system, which contributed to widespread efforts to rethink and reshape the politics-patronage-social science nexus starting in the mid-1960s.Based on extensive archival research, "Shaky Foundations" addresses fundamental questions about the intellectual foundations of the social sciences, their relationships with the natural sciences and the humanities, and the political and ideological import of academic social inquiry.

Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America

Foreword: Positioning Social Science in Cold War America T.M.Porter Cold War Social Science: Spectre, Reality, or Useful Concept? M.Solovey PART I: KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION The Rise and Fall of Wartime Social Science: Harvard's Refugee Interview Project, 1950-54 D.C.Engerman Futures Studies: A New Social Science Rooted in Cold War Strategic Thinking K.Tolon 'It was All Connected': Computers and Linguistics in Early Cold War America J.Martin-Nielsen Epistemic Design: Theory and Data in Harvard's Department of Social Relations J.Isaac PART II: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY Producing Reason H.Heyck Column Right, March! Nationalism, Scientific Positivism, and the Conservative Turn of the American Social Sciences in the Cold War Era H.Cravens From Expert Democracy to Beltway Banditry: How the Anti-War Movement Expanded the Military-Academic-Industrial Complex J.Rohde Neo-Evolutionist Anthropology, the Cold War, and the Beginnings of the World Turn in U.S. Scholarship H.Brick PART III: HUMAN NATURE Maintaining Humans E.Jones-Imhotep Psychology, Psychologists, and the Creativity Movement: The Lives of Method Inside and Outside the Cold War M.Bycroft An Anthropologist on TV: Ashley Montagu and the Biological Basis of Human Nature, 1945-1960 N.Weidman Cold War Emotions: The War over Human Nature M.Vicedo

Cold War social science : knowledge production, liberal democracy, and human nature

This article proposes that the postwar National Science Foundation (NSF) debate constituted a critical, transitional episode in American social science and partisan politics. I show that by responding to powerful conservative critics in the scientific and political communities, the Social Science Research Council's (SSRC's) leading scholars (re)asserted a contested scientistic strategy-to advance the social sciences by following the natural sciences. Further, I reconstruct a wider and longer framework of analysis in order to recover central challenges to the scientistic strategy raised by prominent liberal scholars who rejected the associated commitments to value neutrality and disinterested professionalism. In developing this framework for understanding the contrasting fortunes of each strategy, this article argues that the NSF debate has a deep historical significance-for the social sciences, for American liberalism, and for the nation.

Riding natural scientists' coattails onto the endless frontier: the SSRC and the quest for scientific legitimacy.

President Truman’s signature on the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 marked the end of a seven-year battle to create a postwar federal science agency.’ Dramatically different visions separated the two sides in the struggle. Populists and many New Dealers advocated an agency that would link scientific research directly to economic development and make the results of federally funded research widely available for commercial use. They also wanted an agency that would be readily accountable to the American public, ultimately through the president. Elite scientists and their business allies, in contrast, favored an agency that would be controlled by scientists and would have the narrower mission of supplying resources for what they called ”basic” or ”fundamental” research. After winning the legislative war of the 1940s, elite scientists faced the problem of securing the peace. Two intimately related issues in particular would plague the agency for the indefinite future. The first concerned the relationship between the agency’s work and the national welfare. The foundation’s leaders had to convince members of a cost-conscious and practical-minded Congress to appropriate tax dollars for “basic” scientific research, where the practical payoffs of such research were by no means transparent either to legislators or their constituents. Explaining the agency’s relevance to national needs therefore promised to be an ongoing and arduous task. We call this the problem of releunnce. The second issue concerned control of the agency. The ideology that informed the practices of the science elite in charge of the agency suggested that scientific progress would be impeded if the foundation’s programs were subject to the same political pressures

Hot Science/Cold War: The National Science Foundation After World War II

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