Usually, a proof of a theorem contains more knowledge than the mere fact that the theorem is true. For instance, to prove that a graph is Hamiltonian it suffices to exhibit a Hamiltonian tour in it; however, this seems to contain more knowledge than the single bit Hamiltonian/non-Hamiltonian.In this paper a computational complexity theory of the “knowledge” contained in a proof is developed. Zero-knowledge proofs are defined as those proofs that convey no additional knowledge other than the correctness of the proposition in question. Examples of zero-knowledge proof systems are given for the languages of quadratic residuosity and 'quadratic nonresiduosity. These are the first examples of zero-knowledge proofs for languages not known to be efficiently recognizable.

/pdf/the-knowledge-complexity-of-interactive-proof-systems-31apre0ecf.pdf

The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems

We discuss two-party mutual authentication protocols providing authenticated key exchange, focusing on those using asymmetric techniques. A simple, efficient protocol referred to as the station-to-station (STS) protocol is introduced, examined in detail, and considered in relation to existing protocols. The definition of a secure protocol is considered, and desirable characteristics of secure protocols are discussed.

/pdf/authentication-and-authenticated-key-exchanges-3t1h3ox62j.pdf

Authentication and authenticated key exchanges

Many cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based on public-keycryptography, have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versionsare usually the subjects for many textbooks on cryptography This book takes adifferent approach to introducing cryptography: it pays much more attention tofit-for-application aspects of cryptography It explains why "textbook crypto" isonly good in an ideal world where data are random and bad guys behave nicelyIt reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world by demonstratingnumerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under variousreal-world application scenarios This book chooses to introduce a set of practicalcryptographic schemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de factoones, studies them closely, explains their working principles, discusses their practicalusages, and examines their strong (ie, fit-for-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation for modern cryptography

Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice

Burrows, Abadi, and Needham have proposed a logic for the analysis of authentication protocols. It is a logic of belief, with special constructs for expressing some of the central concepts used in au-thentication. The logic has revealed many subt Ieties and serious errors in published protocols. Unfortunately , it has also created some confusion. In this paper, we provide a new semantics for the logic, our attempt to clarify its meaning. In the search for a sound semantics, we have identified many sources of the past confusion. Identifying these sources has helped us improve the logic's syntax and inference rules, and extend its applicability. One of the greatest differences between our semantics and the original semantics is our treatment of belief as a form of resource-bounded, defensible knowledge. 1 Introduction Authentication is the act of determining the identity of a principal (such as a person, computer, or server) in a computer system. Authentication usually plays an important role in secure systems, since a principal controlling a resource must have some way of identifying principals requesting access to the resource. Authentication typically depends on secrets, such as passwords or encryption keys, that one principal can reveal or somehow use to prove its identity to others. Before these secrets can be used, however, they must be distributed to the principals in some way. An authentication protocol is a description of how these secrets are distributed to principals, and how these secrets are used to determine principals' identities. Permission to copy whhout fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM cowrkht notice and th@title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee andlor specific permission. A simple authentication protocol is given as an example in Figure 1. (This is actually a very incomplete description of the Kerberos key distribution protocol [M NSS87, KNS90].) The three principals involved are a server S trusted to generate good encryption keys, and two principals A and B. The goal of this protocol is for A and B to acquire a key that they can use in their communication. Principal A begins by aending a request for a key to the server S. The server responds with a message …

A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)

The pioneering and well-known work of M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham (1989), (the BAN logic) which dominates the area of security protocol analysis is shown to take an approach which is not fully formal and which consequently permits approval of dangerous protocols. Measures to make the BAN logic formal are then proposed. The formalisation is found to be desirable not only for its potential in providing rigorous analysis of security protocols, but also for its readiness for supporting a computer-aided fashion of analysis. >

Towards formal analysis of security protocols

In the quest for open systems, standardization of security mechanisms, framework, and protocols are becoming increasingly important. This puts high demands on the correctness of the standards. In this paper we use a formal logic-based approach to protocol analysis introduced by Burrows et al. [1]. We extend this logic to deal with protocols using public key cryptography, and with the notion of "duration" to capture some time-related aspects. The extended logic is used to analyse an important CCITT standard, the X.509 Authentication Framework. We conclude that protocol analysis can benefit from the use of the notation and that it highlights important aspects of the protocol analysed. Some aspects of the formalism need further study.

/pdf/applying-a-formal-analysis-technique-to-the-ccitt-x-509-3lwld4c11h.pdf

Applying a formal analysis technique to the CCITT X.509 strong two-way authentication protocol

In the quest for open systems, standardisation of security mechanisms, framework and protocols are becoming increasingly important. This puts high demands on the correctness of the standards.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBFb0030355.pdf

On The Formal Analysis of PKCS Authentication Protocols

Handle everyday research tasks with reliable, citation-backed results

Your personal Research Agent to handle research tasks with citation-backed results

Popular Tasks used by Researchers

How can I help with your research?

Meet SciSpace

Get more enhanced response by uploading the PDFs you want me to reference.

No relevant PDFs in your library

SciSpace is the AI research assistant for academics. Run systematic literature reviews on 280M+ papers, and write papers with cited sources. Trusted by 1M+ students, PhDs & researchers.

SciSpace | AI for Research

Analyze PDFs

Code & Manuscripts

Funding & Grants

Literature & Patents

Medical & Clinical Data

Systematic Review

Visualize & Present

Web & Data

Build a Google Scholar-like website for your research.

Build a website

Create charts and images for your research

Create a Chart

Write a paper for submission to a journal

Draft a manuscript

Patent Search

Design eye-catching scientific posters in minutes.

Scientific Poster Generation

Systematic Literature Review

One task is running at the moment. Your messages will be shown right after.

Drag and drop or click here to browse

Loved by <highlight>1 million+</highlight> researchers

Extract a list of specific topics and their sources from unstructured text

Topics

Compare and analyze relevant papers that matches with your search

Papers

Get insights from PDFs and bookmarked papers from your library

My library

Recent searches

Try searching for:

Catch AI-generated content in scholarly and non-scholarly content

{ai} Detector

Ai Writer

Get PDF Summaries, highlighted text explanations 

Chat with PDF

Effortlessly create in-text citations and bibliographies in APA and 2,500 other formats

Citation generator

Get explanations, summaries, and answers on academic papers

Ease up your research workflow with {scispace}'s cohort of exciting AI tools

Elevate your academic writing skills and convey your ideas the way you want

Paraphraser

Explore our range of reading and writing tools

Your file is being prepared and should be ready in a few minutes. If it's a large file, it might take a bit longer. You can close this window, and we'll email you the file when it's done.

You have reached a maximum limit of <strong>{limit}</strong> columns in the table. Remove at least <strong>1</strong> column to add or create another one.

Klaus Gaarder

Author Tools

Chat about Author

Papers

Applying a formal analysis technique to the CCITT X.509 strong two-way authentication protocol

On The Formal Analysis of PKCS Authentication Protocols