Kevin Tseng
National Taiwan University
28 Papers
22 Citations
Kevin Tseng is an academic researcher from National Taiwan University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Product market & Executive compensation. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 26 publications. Previous affiliations of Kevin Tseng include Federal Reserve System & University of Kansas.
Chat about Author
Papers
•Journal Article
Valuation of New Trademarks
TL;DR: The authors found that the number of new trademark registrations positively predicts firm profitability, stock returns, and underreact to new products or services, and that new trademark registration positively predicts stock returns.
49
More Cash, Less Innovation: The Effect of the American Jobs Creation Act on Patent Value
TL;DR: This article found that multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the United States under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms.
42
More Cash, Less Innovation: The Effect of the American Jobs Creation Act on Patent Value
TL;DR: This article found that multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the US under the American Jobs Creation Act generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms They also conduct more exploratory activities This effect only exists among firms in less competitive industries, firms with lower institutional ownership, and firms with overconfident CEOs.
38
Investor network: Implications for information diffusion and asset prices
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the information diffusion of firms in investor networks and found that central investors trade earlier and are more profitable than peripheral investors, and that centralized firms experience less delay in prices, and therefore demand lower price delay premiums than peripheral firms.
25
Short-Termist CEO Compensation in Speculative Markets: A Controlled Experiment*
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the role of speculative stock prices in corporate short-termism and find that longer CEO compensation duration leads to longer CEO investment horizons, less over-investment, and less earnings management.
11