In this paper we use the relative movements in bank loans and commercial paper to provide evidence on the existence of a loan supply channel of monetary policy transmission. A first necessary condition for monetary policy to work through a lending channel is that banks must view loans and securities as imperfect substitutes, so that monetary tightening does affect the availability of bank loans. We find that tighter monetary policy leads to a shift in firms' mix of external financing -- commercial paper issuance rises while bank loans fall, suggesting that loan supply has indeed been reduced. Furthermore, these shifts in the financing mix seem to affect investment (even controlling for interest rates). This implies that bank and non-bank sources of finance are also not perfect substitutes for businesses. We also argue that this view of the transmission mechanism can help explain why interest rate spreads involving commercial paper rates have had considerable predictive power for many measures of economic activity.

/pdf/monetary-policy-and-credit-conditions-evidence-from-the-2u6d0qb1mi.pdf

Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance

We contrast properties of real quantities with those of price levels and stocks of money for ten countries over the last century. Although the magnitude of output fluctuations has varied across countries and periods, relations among real quantities have been remarkably uniform. Properties of price levels, however, exhibit striking differences between periods. Inflation rates are more persistent after World War II than before, and price-level fluctuations are typically procyclical before World War II and countercyclical afterward. Fluctuations in money are less highly correlated with output in the postwar period but are no more persistent than in earlier periods. (JEL E32, E31)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2117348.pdf

International Evidence on the Historical Properties of Business Cycles

Underwriting cycles are unexpected in a structurally competitive industry where financial capital is the major determinant of output capacity. "Arbitrage" theories explain underwriting cycles as largely an artifact of institutional lags and reporting practices: "capacity-constraint" theories view insurance markets as characterized by real frictions that cause underwriting cycles by temporarily reducing the industry's capacity to insure risks. Arbitrage theories imply nofsystematic relationship between capacity and underwriting margins, while capacity-constraint hypotheses predict a negative relationship. This article provides a test of the two theories by examining the empirical relationship between caSacity and underwriting margins. The results, using data on four insurance lines, generally support the capacity-constraint hypothesis; unanticipated decreases in capacity cause higher profitability and prices.

/pdf/capacity-constraints-and-cycles-in-property-casualty-5fb652ye53.pdf

Capacity constraints and cycles in property casualty insurance markets

eginning with Irving Fisher (1933) and John Maynard Keynes (1931 B [1963]), macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the Great Depression. Turning points during the Depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets: stock market collapse, waves of bankruptcy and bank failure, and contractions in the money stock. But the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the Depression has been a source of controversy, as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the Depression. This essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the Depression, and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the Depression and for macroeconomics. I argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial-real links in the Depression followed a paradigm shift in economics. A central, neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets, which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity. Also, the increasing emphasis on learning and "path-dependence" in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy-makers failed to prevent the Depression.

/pdf/financial-factors-in-the-great-depression-5ule39jr1o.pdf

Financial Factors in the Great Depression

This paper is about the size of fiscal multipliers and the sources of recovery from the Great Depression. Its contributions begin with a new quarterly data set for the interwar period that allows development of a VAR model of the U. S. economy over the period 1920-41. The quarterly data facilitate an estimate of the growth rate and level of potential real GDP, and this in turn allows us to date the end of the Great Depression as the period between 1939:Q1, when the output gap was 21.9 percent, and 1941:Q4, when the output gap was -1.3 percent. By using VAR dynamic forecasting and examining the effect of innovations to each variable individually, this paper's baseline result is that 89.1 percent of the 1939:Q1-1941:Q4 recovery can be attributed to fiscal policy innovations, 34.1 percent to monetary policy innovations and the remaining -23.2 percent to the combined effect of the basic VAR dynamic forecast and innovations in non-government components of GDP (N). The paper attributes the negative innovations of N in the second half of 1941 to capacity constraints. Traditional Keynesian multipliers assume that there are no capacity constraints to impede a fiscal-driven expansion in aggregate demand. On the contrary, we find ample evidence of capacity constraints in 1941, particularly in the second half of that year. As a result our preferred government spending multiplier (which starts in 1940:Q2 and subtracts out the forecasts of the no-shock basic VAR model) is 1.80 when the time period ends in 1941:Q2 but only 0.88 when the time period ends in supply-constrained 1941:Q4. Only the 1.80 multiplier is relevant to situations like 2009-10 when capacity constraints are absent across the economy. Two sets of new insights emerge from a review of contemporary print media. We document that the American economy went to war starting in June 1940, fully 18 months before Pearl Harbor, in contrast to the widespread assumption in the previous literature that Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of WWII for the United States. We also detail the bifurcated nature of the 1941 economy, with excess capacity in its labor market but capacity constraints in many of the key manufacturing industries. By July 1941, the American economy was in a state of perceived national emergency. We not only show in two alternative sets of quarterly data that private consumption and investment actually declined in late 1941, but we also explain why. Among these examples, shortages of steel prevented auto companies from satisfying demand, and shortages of aluminum needed for aircraft production suppressed production even of the most humble of household objects, like tea kettles and zippers.

/pdf/the-end-of-the-great-depression-1939-41-policy-contributions-2mfauijx4n.pdf

The End of the Great Depression 1939-41: Policy Contributions and Fiscal Multipliers

Contributions are made by this paper in three areas, methodological, data creation, and empirical. The methodological section finds that, while structural model building exercises may be useful in suggesting lists of variables that may play an explanatory role in investment equations, they generally achieve identification of structural parameters only by imposing arbitrary and unbelievable simplifying assumptions and exclusion restrictions.The paper advocates a hybrid methodology combining guidance from traditional structural models on the choice and form of explanatory variables to be included, with estimation in a reduced-form format that introduces all explanatory variables and the lagged dependent variable with the same number of unconstrained lag coefficients. The second contribution is the use of a new set of quarterly data for major expenditure categories of GNP extending back to 1919. The data file also contains quarterly data back to 1919 for other variables, including the capital stock, interest rates, the cost of capital including tax incentive effects, a proxy for Tobin's "Q", and the real money supply.The empirical results support the view that there are two basic impulses in the business cycle, real and financial.The real impulse appears in our statistical evidence as an autonomous innovation to investment in structures. We interpret these structures innovations as due in turn to changes in the rate of population growth, episodes of speculation and overbuilding, and Schumpeterian waves of innovation.The financial impulse works through the effect on investment of changes in the money supply, as well as the real interest rate (in the case of postwar investment in durable equipment).There is a strong role for the money supply as a determinant of investment behavior, relative to such other factors as the user cost of capital or Tobin's "Q". The role of the money supply is interpreted as primarily reflecting the banking contraction of 1929-33 and the episodes of credit crunches and disintermediation in the postwar years. Another feature of the empirical work is the attention paid to aggregation. Coefficient estimates are more stable when four types of investment expenditures are aggregated along the structures-equipment dimension than along the household-business dimension. Historical decompositions highlight the role of autonomous innovations in structures investment and in the money supply, and an inspection of residuals suggests that the main autonomous downward shift in spending in 1929-30 was in fixed investment, not nondurable consumption.

/pdf/fixed-investment-in-the-american-business-cycle-1919-83-4rcbdsja3b.pdf

Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83

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Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83

Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83