Joel Pearson
University of New South Wales
121 Papers
387 Citations
Joel Pearson is an academic researcher from University of New South Wales. The author has contributed to research in topics: Mental image & Binocular rivalry. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 103 publications. Previous affiliations of Joel Pearson include University of Toronto & Vanderbilt University.
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Papers
Mental Imagery: Functional Mechanisms and Clinical Applications.
TL;DR: Recent translational and clinical research reveals the pivotal role that imagery plays in many mental disorders and suggests how clinicians can utilize imagery in treatment.
892
The human imagination: the cognitive neuroscience of visual mental imagery
TL;DR: Recent insights into the neural mechanisms that underlie visual imagery are discussed, how imagery can be objectively and reliably measured, and how it affects general cognition are discussed.
635
Human brain networks function in connectome-specific harmonic waves
TL;DR: It is reported that functional networks of thehuman brain are predicted by harmonic patterns, ubiquitous throughout nature, steered by the anatomy of the human cerebral cortex, the human connectome, in a new frequency-specific representation of cortical activity, that is called ‘connectome harmonics’.
The Functional Impact of Mental Imagery on Conscious Perception
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that imagery, in the absence of any incoming visual signals, leads to the formation of a short-term sensory trace that can bias future perception, suggesting a means by which high-level processes that support imagination and memory retrieval may shape low-level sensory representations.
380
The blind mind: No sensory visual imagery in aphantasia.
Rebecca Keogh,Joel Pearson +1 more
TL;DR: Sensory imagery in subjectively self-diagnosed aphantasics is measured, using the binocular rivalry paradigm, as well as measuring their self-rated object and spatial imagery with multiple questionnaires, which suggest that aphantasia is a condition involving a lack of sensory and phenomenal imagery, and not a loss of metacognition.
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