Jihong Lee

TL;DR: In this article, the repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with innitely-lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period is examined, and it is shown that an SCF is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that its Nash equilibrium set is non-empty and every Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty.

TL;DR: It is shown that in the complete information environment an SCF is repeated-implementable if and only if it is effcient, and the incomplete information analysis can be extended to incorporate the notion of ex post equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, only efficient equilibria survive in negotiation games (with sufficiently patient players) while, in sharp contrast, it is only the most inefficient outcome involving perpetual disagreement that survives in costly bargaining games.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the negotiation game with two-person alternating offers and repeated games and show that when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, only efficient equilibria survive.