Jean-Sébastien Coron
University of Luxembourg
174 Papers
2.6K Citations
Jean-Sébastien Coron is an academic researcher from University of Luxembourg. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Encryption. The author has an hindex of 46, co-authored 169 publications. Previous affiliations of Jean-Sébastien Coron include École Normale Supérieure & Digital Management, Inc..
Chat about Author
Papers
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Jean-Sébastien Coron
- 12 Aug 1999
TL;DR: This paper generalizes DPA attack to elliptic curve (EC) cryptosystems and describes a DPA on EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange and EC EI-Gamal type encryption that enable to recover the private key stored inside the smart-card.
Merkle-Damgård revisited: how to construct a hash function
Jean-Sébastien Coron,Yevgeniy Dodis,Cécile Malinaud,Prashant Puniya +3 more
- 14 Aug 2005
TL;DR: It is shown that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard transformation — does not satisfy a new security notion for hash-functions, stronger than collision-resistance.
Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers with shorter public keys
Jean-Sébastien Coron,Avradip Mandal,David Naccache,Mehdi Tibouchi +3 more
- 14 Aug 2011
TL;DR: It is shown that fully homomorphic encryption can be implemented using simple arithmetic operations, and some optimizations from the recent Gentry-Halevi implementation of Gentry's scheme are obtained, roughly the same level of efficiency.
Practical Multilinear Maps over the Integers
Jean-Sébastien Coron,Tancrède Lepoint,Mehdi Tibouchi +2 more
- 18 Aug 2013
TL;DR: A different construction that works over the integers instead of ideal lattices, similar to the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and a different technique for proving the full randomization of encodings, using the classical leftover hash lemma over a quotient lattice.
•Journal Article
On the exact security of Full Domain Hash
TL;DR: In this article, a slightly different proof is presented which provides a tighter security reduction for the full domain hash (FDH) scheme in the random oracle model, assuming that inverting RSA is hard and that smaller RSA moduli can be used for the same level of security.
456