State-Trait Anxiety Inventoryによるペインクリニック外来患者の不安の評価

Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory (Khemlani, Barbey, & Johnson-Laird, 2014) and the causal model theory (Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009), which explain causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively. In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for people’s ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed.

/pdf/causal-reasoning-with-forces-47mok4xzns.pdf

Causal reasoning with forces

Partly as a side effect of the "Decade of the Brain," general readers with an interest in science have been afflicted with a surfeit of books about the brain from writers of curiously varied backgrounds. This one, with its garish title and disjointed assortment of 18 chapters, is by the distinguished codiscoverer of the structure of DNA. Some work is required to tease out of the disorderly text the two main components of the book. One of them, the better, consists of an account of current knowledge and trends of thinking about neural structure and function, with special emphasis on the cortical visual system of the higher mammals. The other component, appearing irrepressibly in bits and pieces throughout the book, as well as in longer passages, consists of a mixture of Crick's zealous and uncritical Newton-or-bust ways of thinking about the relation of consciousness to brain and an insouciant polemic,

The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul

Causal Reasoning from Forces Aron Barbey (abarbey@emoryedu) and Phillip Wolff (pwolff@emoryedu) Department of Psychology, Emory University 532 N Kilgo Circle, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA Everyday language suggests we use forces in causal reasoning We say, for example, The force of his argument cannot be denied, or Your argument doesn’t go through, or The social progressive argument has tremendous moral force Recent work in force dynamics suggests how these intuitions might be fleshed out computationally According to force dynamics, people represent causal relationships in terms of configurations of force (Talmy, 1988; Wolff & Zettergren, 2002) One force, F A , is associated with an affector, that is, the entity that acts on another entity Another force, F B , is associated with a patient, the entity that is acted on by the affector A third force, F BA , is the resultant produced from the addition of these forces Various causal concepts entail different configurations of force For example, as shown in Figure 1, in a CAUSE configuration F A and F B are in opposition and the resultant, F BA , is towards the endstate, E The model holds that the affector in the conclusion is based on the affector vector in the 1 st premises, F A , and that the endstate in the conclusion, E C , is based on the endstate from the 2 nd premise The patient vector in the conclusion is based on the patient vectors in the 1 st or 2 nd premises Roughly stated, the force of the patient is towards the endstate, E C, if either F C or F B point toward that endstate, implying that the patient would make progress towards the endstate in the absence of F A  Table 1 Conclusions drawn by participants (N = 19) Fig 1 Causal concepts and their configurations The predictions of the model were tested in a replication of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird’s (2001) Experiment 4 Participants reviewed sixteen syllogisms that involved psychological terms (eg, obedience causes motivation, motivation causes eccentricity) Participants indicated what, if anything, followed Table 1 shows the conclusion predicted by the transitive dynamics model along with the number of participants choosing that conclusion As can be seen, the model predicted the modal response for all but one of the arguments, prevent-prevent Here we believe participants’ modal response, “prevents,” was influenced by atmosphere of the argument The results also replicated the findings of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001), except for three arguments, but it is for these three arguments that the predictions of our model differ from those of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird’s In sum, the results demonstrate how reasoning might be accomplished through chains of forces The transitive dynamics model specifies how these configurations of force are combined to generate conclusions Consider the inference problems in Figure 2 Fig 2 Transitive arguments and configurations of force The model holds that people use the resultant of the 1 st premise as the affector vector in the 2 nd premise in the case of CAUSE and ENABLE relations, but not PREVENT relations In the case of PREVENT relations, the magnitude of the resultant may equal 0, so the model holds that in the case of PREVENT relations, people use the force of patient in the 1 st premise, F B , as the affector vector in the 2 nd premise These common forces (either F BA or F B ) connect the premises and allow the forces between them to be oriented with respect to one another References Goldvarg, E, & Johnson-Laird, P (2001) Naive causality: A mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning Cognitive Science, 25, 565-610 Talmy, L (1988) Force dynamics in language and cognition Cognitive Science, 12, 49-100 Wolff, P, & Zettergren, M (2002) A vector model of causal meaning Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp 944- 949) Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

/pdf/causal-reasoning-from-forces-49icbw9xe8.pdf

Causal Reasoning from Forces

The logic of decision and action

https://philpapers.org/archive/ROBVIJ.pdf

Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures

We provide empirical evidence that people who believe in dualism are more likely to be uncomfortable with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and to view it as threatening to their identity, humanity, or self. It is (neurocentric) materialists—who think the mind just is the brain—that are less inclined to fear DBS or to see it as threatening. We suggest various possible reasons for this connection. The inspiration for this brief report is a target article that addresses this issue from a theoretical perspective. Mecacci and Haselager (MH this issue) offer several interesting hypotheses about the negative psycho-social side-effects of having an electronic device implanted in one’s brain via Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), such as feeling like a different person or a machine. The authors argue that one’s beliefs about the relation between the mind and the body (e.g., dualism vs. materialism) can promote or attenuate such “psycho-social maladaptations.” One of their core hypotheses is that a belief in dualism protects against these effects, since “the stimulations will not touch one’s ‘genuine self’” if one believes “the brain is not involved in the very nature of your mind and self” (ms. p. 3). On the other hand, Mecacci and Haselager claim a belief in “neurocentric” materialism may lead one to “feel exposed to a personal disruption, for a stimulator interferes with what is responsible for the entire personal dimension, the brain” (ms. p. 3). If M&H are right, people who accept dualism should (a) be less likely to view DBS as a threat to personal identity, (b) be more comfortable with DBS in general, and (c) not see DBS as a procedure that would make people “less human.” These views, if true, are likely to hold for DBS patients as well as the general public. For example, nonDBS patients who are dualists should see DBS as less of a threat to personal identity than materialists would.

/pdf/does-belief-in-dualism-protect-against-maladaptive-psycho-2t76xghjtr.pdf

Does Belief in Dualism Protect against Maladaptive Psycho-Social Responses to Deep Brain Stimulation? An Empirical Exploration

A number of scientists have recently argued that neuroscience provides strong evidence against the requirements of the folk notion of free will. In one such line of argumentation, it is claimed that choice is required for free will, and neuroscience is showing that people do not make choices. In this article, we argue that this no-choice line of argumentation relies on a specific conception of choice. We then provide evidence that people do not share the conception of choice required of the argument, nor do people hold that free will requires the conception of choice on which the argument relies. This leaves the proponents of the no-choice argument with a dilemma: Either they adopt a conception of choice that is not required of the folk concept of free will and thus they cease to be talking about the folk concept of free will, or they adopt a conception of choice that aligns with the folk concept of choice and thus the no-choice argument fails.

Neuroscience, Choice, and the Free Will Debate

Future Orientation as a Universal Feature of Wellbeing: Leveraging Big Data for Cross-cultural Research

What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice

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