Jarrad Harford
University of Washington
117 Papers
889 Citations
Jarrad Harford is an academic researcher from University of Washington. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cash & Corporate governance. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 110 publications. Previous affiliations of Jarrad Harford include University of Oregon & Fudan University.
Chat about Author
Papers
Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments
Tao Chen,Jarrad Harford,Chen Lin +2 more
TL;DR: In this article, the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders are explored, and the most significant effects are mainly driven by the firms with smaller initial analyst coverage and less product market competition.
Payout Policy Trade-Offs and the Rise of 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plans
TL;DR: This work is the first to document and study the use of Rule 10b5-1 preset repurchase plans and indicates that the rule’s original intent was to clarify conditions for enforcing insider trading laws.
The Covid-19 Crisis and the Allocation of Capital
Ran Duchin,Jarrad Harford +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors synthesize the results of the articles in this symposium issue on research in financial economics related to the COVID-19 pandemic and argue that the articles, taken together, present evidence that the pandemic resulted in a distributional shock to capital allocation.
Operating Leverage, Profitability and Capital Structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors demonstrate the effect of operating leverage on firms' financial leverage decisions during the financial crisis and find empirically that, by removing operating leverage from profitability, the negative association between the profitability and financial leverage decreases by about 70%, confirming the channel.
Ex-post Bargaining, Corporate Cash Holdings, and Executive Compensation
TL;DR: This paper showed that high cash holdings can be used by executives in the ex post bargaining over compensation, and that an increase of cash holdings by 10% of assets corresponds to about $2.7 million in additional CEO total compensation.