Humberto Moreira
Fundação Getúlio Vargas
79 Papers
369 Citations
Humberto Moreira is an academic researcher from Fundação Getúlio Vargas. The author has contributed to research in topics: Optimal mechanism & Moral hazard. The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 64 publications.
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Papers
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Do Dividends Signal More Earnings? A Theoretical Analysis
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that, in the absence of this property, signaling is possible, and changes in dividends and change in earnings can be positively or negatively related, and that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach.
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Robust Mechanisms: the curvature case
TL;DR: In this paper, the robust design problem is recast as a zero-sum game played by the principal and an adversarial nature who seeks to minimize her expected payoffs, and the robust mechanism and the worst case distribution are, then, the Nash equilibrium of such game.
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Solving Euler equations: classical methods and the C¹ contraction mapping method revisited
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the classical methods used to solve the Euler equations and test the numerical robustness of this method when it is used in models with sensitiveness to initial conditions.
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Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences
Aloisio Araujo,Humberto Moreira +1 more
- 01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: In this paper, a non-monotone relation between coverage and risk has been investigated in the literature of insurance models, where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter).
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The empirical content of the signaling hypothesis
Aloisio Araujo,Daniel Gottlieb,Humberto Moreira +2 more
- 01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the signaling hypothesis of the usual signaling models cannot be identified in general, and they show that any function from a space of types to the signal space (signaling function) and an increasing wage schedule can be rationalized as an equilibrium profile of many signaling models.
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