Eric Miles
Northeastern University
26 Papers
171 Citations
Eric Miles is an academic researcher from Northeastern University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Multilinear map & Obfuscation (software). The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 26 publications. Previous affiliations of Eric Miles include University of California & University of California, Los Angeles.
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Papers
Zeroizing Without Low-Level Zeroes: New MMAP Attacks and their Limitations
Jean-Sébastien Coron,Craig Gentry,Shai Halevi,Tancrède Lepoint,Hemanta K. Maji,Hemanta K. Maji,Eric Miles,Mariana Raykova,Amit Sahai,Mehdi Tibouchi +9 more
- 16 Aug 2015
TL;DR: Cheon, Han, Lee, Ryu and Stehle as mentioned in this paper extended the zeroizing attacks of Eurocrypt 2015 on multilinear maps to settings where no encodings of zero below the maximal level are available.
Annihilation Attacks for Multilinear Maps: Cryptanalysis of Indistinguishability Obfuscation over GGH13
Eric Miles,Amit Sahai,Mark Zhandry +2 more
- 14 Aug 2016
TL;DR: Using annihilation attacks, this work gives the first polynomial-time cryptanalysis of candidate iO schemes over GGH13, and exhibits two simple programs that are functionally equivalent, and shows how to efficiently distinguish between the obfuscations of these two programs.
Post-zeroizing Obfuscation: New Mathematical Tools, and the Case of Evasive Circuits
Saikrishna Badrinarayanan,Eric Miles,Amit Sahai,Mark Zhandry +3 more
- 08 May 2016
TL;DR: The obfuscator survives all known attacks on the underlying multilinear maps, by proving that no top-level encodings of 0 can be created by a generic-model adversary, and a key new mathematical tool is obtained to analyze security in a post-zeroizing world.
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Protecting obfuscation against arithmetic attacks
Eric Miles,Amit Sahai,Mor Weiss +2 more
TL;DR: This work proposes and analyzes another variant of the Garg et al. obfuscator in a setting that imposes fewer restrictions on the adversary, which it is called the arithmetic setting, and shows that VBB security can be achieved under a complexity-theoretic assumption related to the ETH.
Shielding circuits with groups
Eric Miles,Emanuele Viola +1 more
- 01 Jun 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how to construct a leakage-resistant AC0 circuit by exploiting properties of Au beyond what is sufficient for Barrington's theorem, and extend the construction to the multi-query setting by relying on a simple secure hardware component.