Douglas J. Skinner
University of Chicago
116 Papers
790 Citations
Douglas J. Skinner is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Earnings & Financial accounting. The author has an hindex of 58, co-authored 114 publications. Previous affiliations of Douglas J. Skinner include American Accounting Association & University of Rochester.
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Papers
Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the earnings-related disclosures made by a random sample of 93 NASDAQ firms during 1981-90 and found that good news disclosures tend to be point or range estimates of annual earnings-per-share (EPS), while bad news disclosures tended to be qualitative statements about the current quarter's earnings; the (unconditional) stock price response to bad
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Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio
TL;DR: In this article, the inferior returns to growth stocks relative to value stocks are the result of overoptimistic expectations about future earnings performance, which are corrected through subsequent negative earnings surprises.
Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators
TL;DR: The authors explore the reasons for these different perceptions, and argue that each of these groups may benefit from some rethinking of their views about earnings management, and suggest that each group may need to consider rethinking.
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Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the fact that accounting academics often have very different perceptions of earnings management than do practitioners and regulators, and argue that each of these groups may benefit from some rethinking of their views about earnings management.
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Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis
TL;DR: This paper used Dealscan, a database of private corporate lending agreements, to provide large-sample tests of the debt covenants hypothesis, and they found that private lenders set covenants tightly and use them as trip wires for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively often and that violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress.