As governmental activity has expanded, scholars have been increasingly inclined to suggest that the structure of public policies has an important influence on patterns of political change. Yet research on policy feedback is mostly anecdotal, and there has so far been little attempt to develop more general hypotheses about the conditions under which policies produce politics. Drawing on recent research, this article suggests that feedback occurs through two main mechanisms. Policies generate resources and incentives for political actors, and they provide those actors with information and cues that encourage particular interpretations of the political world. These mechanisms operate in a variety of ways, but have significant effects on government elites, interest groups, and mass publics. By investigating how policies influence different actors through these distinctive mechanisms, the article outlines a research agenda for moving from the current focus on illustrative case studies to the investigation of broader propositions about how and when policies are likely to be politically consequential.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100008911

When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change

This article considers the impact of public opinion on public policy, asking: (1) how much impact it has; (2) how much the impact increases as the salience of issues increases; (3) to what extent t...

/pdf/the-impact-of-public-opinion-on-public-policy-a-review-and-1yzb70a2is.pdf

The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda:

Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory. We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. The theory is simple in form, realistic in its principal assumptions, and counterintuitive in its main implications. Empirically, the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable. In a later section, we briefly bring preferences back in, examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference-centered lobbying should occur.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055406062010

Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy

The complexity and diversity of European interest politics is exem- plie ed by the multitude of channels and targets that private actors use to lobby in the EU multi-level system. The aim of this article is to investigate the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behaviour of private interests. A theoretical framework is developed in order to explain the access of business interests to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In order to gain access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. Organizational form is introduced as the innovative unit of analysis. It follows that associative business action is unconventionally studied in relation to two other organizational forms: individual company action and third- party representation.

Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access

In a constantly changing business environment, firms with access to those who make public policy enjoy competitive advantage. To gain such access, politically active firms engage in a variety of ta...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3069303.pdf

Pursuing Strategic Advantage Through Political Means: A Multivariate Approach

Through a comprehensive analysis of American agricultural politics in the past half-century, "Gaining Access" shows when, how, and why interest groups gain and lose influence in the policy deliberations of the United States Congress. By consulting with policy advocates, John Mark Hansen argues, lawmakers offset their uncertainty about the policy stands that will bolster or impede their prospects for reelection. The advocates provide legislators with electoral intelligence in Washington and supportive propaganda at home, earning serious consideration of their policy views in return. From among a multitude of such informants, representatives must choose those they will most closely consult. With evidence from congressional hearings, personal interviews, oral histories, farm and trade journals, and newspapers, Hansen traces the evolution of farm lobby access in Congress. He chronicles the rise and fall of the American Farm Bureau, the surge and decline of party politics, the incoporation of the commodity lobbies, the exclusion of the consumer lobbies, and the accommodation of urban interests in food stamps. Brilliantly combining insights from rational choice theory with historical data, "Gaining Access" is an essential guide for anyone interested in the dynamics of interest group influence.

Gaining access : Congress and the farm lobby, 1919-1981

Agricultural-Food Policy Review: Perspectives for the 1980's

During the first century of the Republic, legislatures stood at the heart of state government and, during the first third of that century, at the heart of state politics as well. The Pennsylvania legislature, like those in other states, not only made policy, its members also participated in the choosing of governors and presidential electors. It elected U.S. Senators and state treasurers as well as officers within the legislature. These functions gave it an important place in the development of political parties and also had implications for the legislature's own development. But by 1830, the legislature's substantial political power had dwindled to the point where it was left with only a secondary role in state politics. Its primacy in policymaking continued but its ability to choose governors and influence presidential elections had been sharply curtailed by the forces of political change. This article will examine the legislature's evolving role in Pennsylvania politics between 1790 and 1830 with emphasis on its most important political instrument, the caucus.' The early nineteenth century caucus used to be portrayed as \"King Caucus,\" an aristocratic tool by which a small group of leaders kept a vise-like grip on power. Progressive school historians explained its replacement by the nominating convention as a victory for democracy over aristocracy. More recently, the caucus has been seen in a less hostile light as a key ingredient in party development, \"the cradle of the organization of American parties,\" as Mosei Ostrogorsky put it.2 None of these interpretations fully explains the importance of caucuses in political life. The battle over caucuses cannot be depicted as simply a class struggle won by democratic elements, and it was not treated that way at the time. Yet the caucus had a significance beyond merely facilitating nominations and other party business. For one thing, it was closely linked to evolving republican ideology. The caucus was able to develop in the first place because of ambiguities over the proper position of legislatures in political affairs. The attack on it later came after those ambiguities had been clarified by actual operation of the caucus, which exposed the ideological contradictions of legislative nominations for other branches of government. Moreover, the caucus had an importance for the legislature itself which is not well understood. The caucus solidified the legislature's position in politics and insured that it would continue to attract top political leaders. It held out the promise of disciplined legislative parties voting in accordance with party ideology. But the legislative institution itself

/pdf/from-caucus-to-convention-in-pennsylvania-politics-1790-1830-14clgvjwas.pdf

From Caucus to Convention in Pennsylvania Politics, 1790-1830

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Gaining access : Congress and the farm lobby, 1919-1981

Agricultural-Food Policy Review: Perspectives for the 1980's

From Caucus to Convention in Pennsylvania Politics, 1790-1830