Experience and Educationis the best concise statement on education ever published by John Dewey, the man acknowledged to be the pre-eminent educational theorist of the twentieth century. Written more than two decades after Democracy and Education(Dewey's most comprehensive statement of his position in educational philosophy), this book demonstrates how Dewey reformulated his ideas as a result of his intervening experience with the progressive schools and in the light of the criticisms his theories had received. Analysing both "traditional" and "progressive" education, Dr. Dewey here insists that neither the old nor the new education is adequate and that each is miseducative because neither of them applies the principles of a carefully developed philosophy of experience. Many pages of this volume illustrate Dr. Dewey's ideas for a philosophy of experience and its relation to education. He particularly urges that all teachers and educators looking for a new movement in education should think in terms of the deeped and larger issues of education rather than in terms of some divisive "ism" about education, even such an "ism" as "progressivism." His philosophy, here expressed in its most essential, most readable form, predicates an American educational system that respects all sources of experience, on that offers a true learning situation that is both historical and social, both orderly and dynamic.

经验与教育 = Experience and education

Online publishing, social networks, and web search have dramatically lowered the costs of producing, distributing, and discovering news articles. Some scholars argue that such technological changes increase exposure to diverse perspectives, while others worry that they increase ideological segregation. We address the issue by examining web-browsing histories for 50,000 US-located users who regularly read online news. We find that social networks and search engines are associated with an increase in the mean ideological distance between individuals. However, somewhat counterintuitively, these same channels also are associated with an increase in an individual’s exposure to material from his or her less preferred side of the political spectrum. Finally, the vast majority of online news consumption is accounted for by individuals simply visiting the home pages of their favorite, typically mainstream, news outlets, tempering the consequences—both positive and negative—of recent technological changes. We thus uncover evidence for both sides of the debate, while also finding that the magnitude of the effects is relatively modest.

Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

/pdf/handbook-of-computational-social-choice-12i1xbv1b8.pdf

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

In 1997, Robert Axelrod wondered in a highly influential paper "If people tend to become more alike in their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior when they interact, why do not all such differences eventually disappear?" Axelrod's question highlighted an ongoing quest for formal theoretical answers joined by researchers from a wide range of disciplines. Numerous models have been developed to understand why and under what conditions diversity in beliefs, attitudes and behavior can co-exist with the fact that very often in interactions, social influence reduces differences between people. Reviewing three prominent approaches, we discuss the theoretical ingredients that researchers added to classic models of social influence as well as their implications. Then, we propose two main frontiers for future research. First, there is urgent need for more theoretical work comparing, relating and integrating alternative models. Second, the field suffers from a strong imbalance between a proliferation of theoretical studies and a dearth of empirical work. More empirical work is needed testing and underpinning micro-level assumptions about social influence as well as macro-level predictions. In conclusion, we discuss major roadblocks that need to be overcome to achieve progress on each frontier. We also propose that a new generation of empirically-based computational social influence models can make unique contributions for understanding key societal challenges, like the possible effects of social media on societal polarization.

/pdf/models-of-social-influence-towards-the-next-frontiers-4sx3x7p0gl.pdf

Models of Social Influence: Towards the Next Frontiers

A tutorial on modeling and analysis of dynamic social networks. Part I

Are we as a society getting more polarized, and if so, why? We try to answer this question through a model of opinion formation. Empirical studies have shown that homophily results in polarization. However, we show that DeGroot's well-known model of opinion formation based on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. We generalize DeGroot's model to account for a phenomenon well-known in social psychology as biased assimilation: when presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue, individuals draw undue support for their initial position thereby arriving at a more extreme opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation process results in either polarization, persistent disagreement or consensus depending on how biased individuals are. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides insight into the following related question: do internet based recommender algorithms that show us personalized content contribute to polarization? We make a connection between biased assimilation and the polarizing effects of some random-walk based recommender algorithms that are similar in spirit to some commonly used recommender algorithms.

/pdf/biased-assimilation-homophily-and-the-dynamics-of-4jarl5dfvu.pdf

Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization

We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of voting rules for participatory democracies. We first give algorithms which efficiently elicit \epsilon-approximations to two prominent voting rules: the Borda rule and the Condorcet winner. This result circumvents previous prohibitive lower bounds and is surprisingly strong: even if the number of ideas is as large as the number of participants, each participant will only have to make a logarithmic number of comparisons, an exponential improvement over the linear number of comparisons previously needed. We demonstrate the approach in an experiment in Finland's recent off-road traffic law reform, observing that the total number of comparisons needed to achieve a fixed \epsilon approximation is linear in the number of ideas and that the constant is not large. 
Finally, we note a few other experimental observations which support the use of voting rules for aggregation. First, we observe that rating, one of the common alternatives to ranking, manifested effects of bias in our data. Second, we show that very few of the topics lacked a Condorcet winner, one of the prominent negative results in voting. Finally, we show data hinting at a potential future direction: the use of partial rankings as opposed to pairwise comparisons to further decrease the elicitation time.

Crowdsourcing for Participatory Democracies: Efficient Elicitation of Social Choice Functions

We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of social choice functions in crowdsourcing for participatory democracies. First, we demonstrate the scalability of social choice functions by defining a natural notion of epsilon-approximation, and giving algorithms which efficiently elicit such approximations for two prominent social choice functions: the Borda rule and the Condorcet winner. This result circumvents previous prohibitive lower bounds and is surprisingly strong: even if the number of ideas is as large as the number of participants, each participant will only have to make a logarithmic number of comparisons, an exponential improvement over the linear number of comparisons previously needed. Second, we apply these ideas to Finland's recent off-road traffic law reform, an experiment on participatory democracy in real life. This allows us to verify the scaling predicted in our theory and show that the constant involved is also not large. In addition, by collecting data on the time that users take to complete rankings of varying sizes, we observe that eliciting partial rankings can further decrease elicitation time as compared to the common method of eliciting pairwise comparisons.

/pdf/crowdsourcing-for-participatory-democracies-efficient-2qs6o1uhd5.pdf

Though deliberation is a critical component of democratic decision-making, existing deliberative processes do not scale to large groups of people. Motivated by this, we propose a model in which large-scale decision-making takes place through a sequence of small group interactions. Our model considers a group of participants, each having an opinion which together form a graph. We show that for median graphs, a class of graphs including grids and trees, it is possible to use a small number of three-person interactions to tightly approximate the wisdom of the crowd, defined here to be the generalized median of participant opinions, even when agents are strategic. Interestingly, we also show that this sharply contrasts with small groups of size two, for which we prove an impossibility result. Specifically, we show that it is impossible to use sequences of two-person interactions satisfying natural axioms to find a tight approximation of the generalized median, even when agents are non-strategic. Our results demonstrate the potential of small group interactions for reaching global decision-making properties.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2940716.2940722

Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads

Voting is commonly used as a method for aggregating information in crowdsourcing and human computation. In many settings, one would like to use voting rules which can be efficiently elicited, preserve voter privacy, and are robust to strategic manipulation. In this paper, we give algorithms which elicit approximate winners in a way which provably satisfies all three of these requirements simultaneously. Our results hold for tournament voting rules, which we define to be the voting rules which can be expressed solely as a function of the table of pairwise comparisons containing the number of voters preferring one candidate to another. Tournament voting rules include many common voting rules such as the Borda, Copeland, Maximin, Nanson, Baldwin, Kemeny-Young, Ranked Pairs, Cup, and Schulze voting rules. Our results significantly expand the set of voting rules for which efficient elicitation was known to be possible and improve the known approximation factors for e-strategyproof voting in the regime where the number of candidates is large.

/pdf/efficient-private-and-e-strategyproof-elicitation-of-3glxx3e8to.pdf

Efficient, private, and ε-strategyproof elicitation of tournament voting rules

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Papers

Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization

Crowdsourcing for Participatory Democracies: Efficient Elicitation of Social Choice Functions

Crowdsourcing for Participatory Democracies: Efficient Elicitation of Social Choice Functions

Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads

Efficient, private, and ε-strategyproof elicitation of tournament voting rules