List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

/pdf/decision-making-in-political-systems-veto-players-in-3p92hkx24o.pdf

Decision Making in Political Systems Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

This article examines the distribution of parks in Baltimore, Maryland, as an environmental justice issue. In addition to established methods for measuring distribution of and access to parks, we employ a novel park service area approach that uses Thiessen polygons and dasymetric reapportioning of census data to measure potential park congestion as an equity outcome measure. We find that a higher proportion of African Americans have access to parks within walking distance, defined as 400 meters or less, than whites, but whites have access to more acreage of parks within walking distance than blacks. A needs-based assessment shows that areas with the highest need have the best access to parks but also have access to less acreage of parks compared to low-need areas. Park service areas that are predominantly black have higher park congestion than areas that are predominantly white, although differences are less apparent at the city level than at the metropolitan level. Following Iris Young and others, we arg...

https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/jrnl/2009/nrs_2009_boone_001.pdf

Parks and people: an environmental justice inquiry in Baltimore, Maryland.

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

Geographic information systems (GIS) can provide leisure service agencies with numerous opportunities to enhance the planning and management of their facilities. This paper demonstrates one such application, to the measurement of levels of accessibility and distributional equity offered by a system of public parks. The methods proposed are relatively simple; nevertheless, they do offer substantial improvements upon those previously utilized by leisure service providers. They facilitate identification of poorly served areas and populations, and suggest where new facilities might best be sited so as to maximize access and equity. These methods are illustrated by a case study of the park system in Bryan, Texas. Many other applications of GIS to leisure service provision are available, several of which are briefly discussed. Together, they could enable agencies to function more effectively and, ultimately, to provide better levels of service to the public.

http://staff.washington.edu/kwolf/Archive/Classes/ESRM304_SocSci/304%20Soc%20Sci%20Lab%20Articles/Nicholls_2001.pdf

Measuring the accessibility and equity of public parks: a case study using GIS

T HE THEORY OF "sophisticated" voting addresses the problem of how an individual can make the best use of his votes. Circumstances may arise when it is advantageous to vote contrary to one's own preferences. When votes are taken on several issues, an individual may be better off after the last vote if he does not vote in accordance with his preferences on every issue. A sophisticated strategy is a plan telling him how his votes can best be used when others are doing likewise. Initially developed by Farquharson in his Theory of Voting,' sophisticated voting has received theoretical attention from McKelvey and Niemi,2 Enelow and Koehler,3 and others. This attention has focused on legislative voting games, which are characterized by a finite sequence of two-alternative issues. However, little testing of the theory has yet been done. This paper is motivated by the need to determine the utility of the theory for predicting and explaining real legislative voting. To be specific, this paper will examine two simple amendment strategies and show

The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress

The yolk is an important new concept for analysis of the instability of majority choice by committees. This paper reports a generalization of the definition of the yolk which extends its applicability to even-numbered committees and to supramajority choice. It also reports the results of computation of the location and size of the yolk for committees of different sizes. The results confirm earlier conjectures and findings that majority choice is likely to be confined to a centrally located subset of an issue space which is small and which decreases in size with increases in committee membership.

The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees

In a recent paper concerned with legislative vote trading, Riker and Brams demonstrated "... . the paradox of logrolling: that rational trades by all members [may] make everyone worse off."' In discussing this effect the authors note that "There seems . . . to be an inherent disequilibrium in vote trading which is occasioned by the assumption of individual rationality."2 This instability associated with vote trading has been noted by a number of others. R. E. Park, considering the set of possible legislative outcomes, proved a theorem which states:

Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence

By way of conclusion we shall discuss the significance of our results for understanding legislative voting strategy.

Vote trading in a legislative context: An analysis of cooperative and noncooperative strategic voting

In two-dimensional Euclidean spatial voting models the yolk is the smallest circle which intersects all median lines It has been assumed that limiting median lines, which intersect two voter ideal points, are sufficient to determine the yolk but recently counter examples have been reported This note describes the impact of those findings on the results of computation of the location and size of yolk

Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk

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