Obstet Gynecol Surv 2016;71(1):7–9Since the 1990s, there have been considerable changes in care for mothers in preterm labor and for extremely preterm infants. The Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Neonatal Research Network has monitored changes in this

Trends in Care Practices, Morbidity, and Mortality of Extremely Preterm Neonates, 1993-2012

Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutilitarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research.

Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology.

We introduce and investigate the philosophical concept of 'speciesism' -the assignment of different moral worth based on species membership -as a psychological construct. In five studies, using both general population samples online and student samples, we show that speciesism is a measurable, stable construct with high interpersonal differences, that goes along with a cluster of other forms of prejudice, and is able to predict real-world decision-making and behavior. In Study 1 we present the development and empirical validation of a theoretically driven Speciesism Scale, which captures individual differences in speciesist attitudes. In Study 2, we show high test-retest reliability of the scale over a period of four weeks, suggesting that speciesism is stable over time. In Study 3, we present positive correlations between speciesism and prejudicial attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, along with ideological constructs associated with prejudice such as social dominance orientation, system justification, and right-wing authoritarianism. These results suggest that similar mechanisms might underlie both speciesism and other well-researched forms of prejudice. Finally, in Studies 4 and 5, we demonstrate that speciesism is able to predict prosociality towards animals (both in the context of charitable donations and time investment) and behavioral food choices above and beyond existing related constructs. Importantly, our studies show that people morally value individuals of certain species less than others even when beliefs about intelligence and sentience are accounted for. We conclude by discussing the implications of a psychological study of speciesism for the psychology of human-animal relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

/pdf/the-moral-standing-of-animals-towards-a-psychology-of-357p6g40pf.pdf

The moral standing of animals: Towards a psychology of speciesism.

Introduction I. CHILDREN AND RIGHTS Do Children Have Rights? What Rights (If Any) Do Children Have? Children's Choices of Children's Interests: Which Do Their Rights Protect? Being versus Becoming: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal Theory II. AUTONOMY AND EDUCATION Special Agents: Children's Autonomy and Parental Authority Autonomy, Child Rearing, and Good Lives Children, Multiculturalism, and Education Answering Susan: Liberalism, Civic Education, and the Status of Younger Persons III. CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND JUSTICE Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Differentials and Distributive Justice Equality and the Duties of Procreators Liberal Equality and the Affective Family What Children Really Need: Towards a Critical Theory of Family Structure Family, Choice, and Distributive Justice

The Moral and Political Status of Children

What rights (if any) do children have

Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics

In discussions about the ethics of enhancement, it is often claimed that the concept of ‘human nature’ has no helpful role to play. There are two ideas behind this thought. The first is that nature, human nature included, is a mixed bag. Some parts of our nature are good for us and some are bad for us. The ‘mixed bag’ idea leads naturally to the second idea: the fact that something is part of our nature is, by itself, normatively inert. The Inert View claims that nothing normative follows from the mere fact that some trait is a part of our nature. If the Inert View is correct, then appeals to the value or importance of human nature in debates about enhancement are indeed misplaced. We argue that the Inert View is wrong, and that a certain concept of human nature – which we refer to as ‘human form’ – does have an important role to play in debates about enhancement.

/pdf/is-there-a-role-for-human-nature-in-debates-about-human-4z0x9qprqn.pdf

Is There a Role for ‘Human Nature’ in Debates About Human Enhancement?

The (In)significance of moral disagreement for moral knowledge

Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly administer a placebo in a clinical setting? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are typically said to be 'sham' treatments, with no 'active' properties and so giving a placebo is usually thought to involve tricking or deceiving the patient who expects a genuine treatment. Nonetheless, some physicians have recently suggested that placebo treatments are sometimes the best way to help their patients and can be administered in an honest way.These physicians conclude that placebo treatments are a perfectly acceptable, and ethically unproblematic, mode of treatment. While I grant the common idea that placebos are deceptive is correct, I argue that widespread misunderstandings concerning why this is so has led proponents of placebo treatments to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive. Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly treat a patient with a placebo? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are 'sham' treatments, with no 'active' properties and so giving a placebo involves 'tricking' or 'deceiving' the patient who expects a genuine treatment. I have put the terms 'sham', 'active', 'tricking', 'deceiving' in scare quotes: although I agree that these terms are accurate, the way in which they apply to placebos is not, I shall argue, properly understood. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive. I think this charge sticks, but the way in which placebo treatments are deceptive is misunderstood by both opponents and pro- ponents of placebo treatment. This misunderstanding has led some proponents to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. I conclude by showing that while my arguments provide a strong case against the permissibility of placebo treatment, they do not answer another argument some proponents of placebo treatment make.

/pdf/what-you-don-t-know-can-help-you-the-ethics-of-placebo-3goacuxmmj.pdf

What You Don't Know Can Help You: The Ethics of Placebo Treatment

Some assume that respecting patient autonomy means clinicians should refrain from expressing opinions about what’s in a patient’s best interests. But depending on the kind of medical decision the patient is making, a clinician may have expertise vital to the patient’s best interests and even if she doesn’t, she may still know what is best.

/pdf/what-health-care-providers-know-a-taxonomy-of-clinical-2rwj5twu8a.pdf

What health care providers know: a taxonomy of clinical disagreements.

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