Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

We study how monetary policy in China influences banks' shadow banking activities. We develop and estimate the endogenously switching monetary policy rule that is based on institutional facts and at the same time tractable in the spirit of Taylor (1993). This development, along with two newly constructed micro banking datasets, enables us to establish the following empirical evidence. Contractionary monetary policy during 2009–2015 caused shadow banking loans to rise rapidly, offsetting the expected decline of traditional bank loans and hampering the effectiveness of monetary policy on total bank credit. We advance a theoretical explanation of our empirical findings.

/pdf/the-nexus-of-monetary-policy-and-shadow-banking-in-china-21dp29xsjo.pdf

The Nexus of Monetary Policy and Shadow Banking in China

A quantitative investigation of financial intermediation in the United States over the past 130 years yields the following results: (i ) the finance industry’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is high in the 1920s, low in the 1960s, and high again after 1980; (ii ) most of these variations can be explained by corresponding changes in the quantity of intermediated assets (equity, household and corporate debt, liquidity); (iii ) intermediation has constant returns to scale and an annual cost of 1.5–2 percent of intermediated assets; (iv) secular changes in the characteristics of firms and households are quantitatively important. (JEL D24, E44, G21, G32, N22) This paper is concerned with the theory and measurement of financial intermediation. The role of the finance industry is to produce, trade, and settle financial contracts that can be used to pool funds, share risks, transfer resources, produce information, and provide incentives. Financial intermediaries are compensated for providing these services. The income received by these intermediaries measures the aggregate cost of financial intermediation. This income is the sum of all spreads and fees paid by nonfinancial agents to financial intermediaries and it is also the sum of all profits and wages in the finance industry. This cost of financial intermediation affects the user cost of external finance for firms who issue debt and equity, and the costs for households who borrow or use asset management services.

/pdf/has-the-u-s-finance-industry-become-less-efficient-on-the-4iuu52fboi.pdf

Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation

I provide a quantitative interpretation of financial intermediation in the U.S. over the past 130 years. Measuring separately the cost of intermediation and the production of financial services, I find that: (i) the quantity of intermediation varies a lot over time; (ii) intermediation is produced under constant returns to scale; (iii) the annual cost of intermediation is around 2% of outstanding assets; (iv) adjustments for borrowers' quality are quantitatively important; and (v) the unit cost of intermediation has increased over the past 30 years.

Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? on the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation

An increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market is the key force behind four empirical features of the housing boom before the Great Recession: the unpreced...

/pdf/credit-supply-and-the-housing-boom-58l1k5qghz.pdf

Credit Supply and the Housing Boom

The US government has recently conducted large scale purchases of assets and implemented policies that reduced the cost of funds to …nancial institutions. Arguably these policies have helped to correct credit market dysfunctions, allowing interest rate spreads to shrink and output to begin a recovery. We study four models of …nancial

/pdf/government-policy-credit-markets-and-economic-activity-2cwab2uv24.pdf

Government Policy, Credit Markets and Economic Activity

We modify an otherwise standard medium-sized DSGE model, in order to study the macroeconomic effects of placing leverage restrictions on financial intermediaries. The financial intermediaries ('bankers') in the model must exert effort in order to earn high returns for their creditors. An agency problem arises because banker effort is not observable to creditors. The consequence of this agency problem is that leverage restrictions on banks generate a very substantial welfare gain in steady state. We discuss the economics of this gain. As a way of testing the model, we explore its implications for the dynamic effects of shocks.

/pdf/leverage-restrictions-in-a-business-cycle-model-4wknyocjan.pdf

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model

The US government has recently conducted large scale purchases of assets and implemented policies that reduced the cost of funds to financial institutions. Arguably these policies have helped to correct credit market dysfunctions, allowing interest rate spreads to shrink and output to begin a recovery. We study four models of financial frictions which explore different channels by which these effects might have occured. Recent events have sparked a renewed interest in leverage restrictions and the consequences of bailouts of the creditors of banks with under-performing assets. We use two of our models to consider the welfare and other effects of these policies.

We modify an otherwise standard medium-sized DSGE model, in order to study the macroeconomic effects of placing leverage restrictions on financial intermediaries The financial intermediaries ('bankers') in the model must exert effort in order to earn high returns for their creditors An agency problem arises because banker effort is not observable to creditors The consequence of this agency problem is that leverage restrictions on banks generate a very substantial welfare gain in steady state We discuss the economics of this gain As a way of testing the model, we explore its implications for the dynamic effects of shocks

We develop an overlapping generations model with leveraged investment in speculative asset bubbles Financial intermediaries use borrowed funds to speculate on a risky asset bubble, which promises high returns as long as it does not collapse They can, however, default on their debt and shift the losses to lenders when the bubble collapses This risk shifting leads to welfare-reducing (or “toxic”) rational asset bubbles We then analyze a set of often discussed policy interventions: pricking bubbles, macroprudential regulations, and leverage restriction

Toxic asset bubbles

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Government Policy, Credit Markets and Economic Activity

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model

Government Policy, Credit Markets and Economic Activity

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model

Toxic asset bubbles