Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400100838

Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.

Conventional models of the politics of economic reform tend to be
 based on an assumption about the costs and benefits of reform,
 known informally as the J-curve. Reforms are expected to make
 things worse before they get better. This presents a classic time
 inconsistency dilemma for reformist governments forced to demand
 severe sacrifices from the public in the short term for the mere
 promise of future gains. In response, political economy models of
 the reform process have tended to stress the importance of
 insulating governments from the pressures of the short-term losers
 until a sufficient constituency of winners has been created with a
 stake in supporting and enhancing the reforms. Based on evidence from the postcommunist transitions, this article
 suggests that the most serious political obstacles to the process of
 economic reform have come not from the short-term losers but from
 the short-term winners. Groups that gain substantial rents from the
 early distortions of a partially reformed economy have a stake in
 maintaining a partial reform equilibrium that generates high private
 gains, but at a considerable social cost. In these countries, the
 main political challenge has been, not to marginalize the losers, but
 to restrain the winners. This explains the paradoxical outcome of
 the postcommunist transitions: that political systems which are
 more inclusive of the losers have been able to adopt and sustain
 more comprehensive economic reforms than states insulated from
 popular pressures.

/pdf/winners-take-all-the-politics-of-partial-reform-in-4v0y80v9nd.pdf

Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions

We survey the empirical literature analyzing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of privatization, the importance of different types of owners, the effects of foreign and domestic competition, the consequences of soft budgets, and the role of managerial incentives and managerial human capital, on enterprise restructuring.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=238716

Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey

A fundamental political-institutional question that has only recently received serious scholarly attention concerns the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation. Little systematic cross-regional evidence has been brought to bear on this question. This article reports the findings of the analysis of numerous different sources of data, all of which point in the direction of a much stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and the constitutional framework of pure parliamentarianism than between consolidation and pure presidentialism. The systematic analysis of these data leads the authors to conclude that parliamentarianism is a more supportive constitutional framework due to the following theoretically predictable and empirically observable tendencies: its greater propensity for governments to have majorities to implement their programs, its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting, its lower propensity for executives to rule at the edge of the constitution and its greater facility in removing a chief executive if he or she does so, its lower susceptibility to a military coup, and its greater tendency to provide long party-government careers, which add loyalty and experience to political society. In contrast, the analytically separable propensities of presidentialism also form a highly interactive system, but they work to impede democratic consolidation by reducing politicians' degrees of freedom.

/pdf/constitutional-frameworks-and-democratic-consolidation-z3ucdblcqk.pdf

Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism

In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, the simultaneous process of developing a market economy, designing new political and social institutions, and redistributing social assets have created fertile ground for corruption. Many governments throughout the region have made combating corruption a priority and have turned to the World Bank for assistance in designing feasible anti-corruption strategies. This report seeks to unbundle the varies practices of corruption to identify and compare different patterns of the problem across transition countries. It then draws out lessons for tailoring anti-corruption strategies to address the variation across the region in an effort to target reforms more effectively. The report draws on a multitude of sources and ongoing research and lessons of experience, including the Bank's work in this area. However the report does not seek to review the Bank's operations or set specific strategic guidelines for its operational work in this area. It is intended as a contribution to the growing policy dialogue on developing practical strategies for reducing corruption.

Anticorruption in transition : a contribution to the policy debate

Contributors Preface 1. Introduction: The Journey to a Market Economy: Christopher Clague Part I: The Problem of the Transition 2. The Next Decade in Central and Eastern Europe: Lawrence Summers 3. Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally Planned Economies: Peter Murrell 4. The Hidden Path to a Successful Economy: Mancur Olson 5. Organizations as Property: Economic Analysis of Property Law Applied to Privatization: Robert Cooter 6. The Transition to a Market Economy: Alan Walters Part II: Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Discipline 7. Taxation, Money, and Credit in a Liberalizing Socialist Economy: Robert McKinnon 8. Stabilization and Liberalization Policies for Economics in Transition: Latin American Lessons for Eastern Europe: Sebastian Edwards 9. The Design of Financial Systems for the Newly Emerging Democracies of Eastern Europe: Joseph E. Stiglitz Part III: Government Policy Toward the Private Sector: Antitrust Policy and the Safety Net 10. Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions: Robert Willig 11. The Safety Net During Transformation: Hungary: David Newbery 12. Institutions for the New Private Sector: Anne Krueger Part IV: The Privatization Process 13. Privatization in East European Transformation: Stanley Fischer 14. The Political Economy of Transition in Eastern Europe: Packaging Enterprises for Privatization: Gordon Rausser and Leo Simon 15. Privatization in East-Central Europe: Avoiding Major Mistakes: Jan Winiecki 16. The Political Economy of Privatization: Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia: Scott Thomas 17. Strategies for the Transition: Arnold Harberger 18. Institutions and the Transition to a Market Economy: Andras Nagy Part V: Conclusions 19. Lessons for Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe: Gordon Rausser References.

The Emergence Of Market Economies In Eastern Europe

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The Emergence Of Market Economies In Eastern Europe