Andrew K. Wright
Intertrust Technologies Corporation
5 Papers
765 Citations
Andrew K. Wright is an academic researcher from Intertrust Technologies Corporation. The author has contributed to research in topics: Unique bid auction & Auction sniping. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 5 publications.
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Papers
Patent
Software self-defense systems and methods
James J. Horning,W. Olin Sibert,Robert E. Tarjan,Umesh Maheshwari,William G. Horne,Andrew K. Wright,Lesley R. Matheson,Susan S. Owicki +7 more
- 07 Apr 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe obfuscation, tamper-resistance, and watermarking techniques for protecting a computer program from unauthorized analysis and modification. But they do not discuss how to detect tampering.
617
Competitive auctions and digital goods
Andrew V. Goldberg,Jason D. Hartline,Andrew K. Wright +2 more
- 09 Jan 2001
TL;DR: It is shown that for any truthful auction, even a multi-price auction, the expected revenue does not exceed that for optimal fixed pricing, and a bound on how far the revenue can be from the total market utility is given.
351
Patent
Systems and methods for watermarking software and other media
William G. Horne,Umeshi Maheshwari,Robert E. Tarjan,James J. Horning,W. Olin Sibert,Lesley R. Matheson,Andrew K. Wright,Susan S. Owicki +7 more
- 29 Oct 2007
TL;DR: In this article, systems and methods for protecting, detecting, removing, and decoding information embedded in electronic content, and for using the embedded information to protect software or other media from unauthorized analysis, attack, and/or modification are presented.
97
Patent
Systems and methods for pricing and selling digital goods
Andrew V. Goldberg,Jason D. Hartline,Andrew K. Wright +2 more
- 27 Oct 2005
TL;DR: In this article, a randomized auction mechanism is used to determine both the number of goods that are sold and the selling price, and the auction mechanism automatically adapts to the bid distribution to yield revenue that is competitive with that which could be obtained if the vendor were able to determine the optimal fixed price for the goods.
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